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The fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I enabled the victorious
Western powers to implement the Sykes-Picot Treaty and reshape the geopolitical
structure of the Middle East. The imposition of arbitrary borders on the Middle East
region, specifically the state of Iraq, would lead to significant conflicts over the course of
the 20th century. In 2003, a US-led invasion would further compound the instability and
sectarian conflict within Iraq by completely dismantling the state. In the years after the
invasion, the United States has been directly involved unsuccessfully in trying to rebuild
and stabilize the state of Iraq.
The goal of this study is to propose and analyze four options for the future
geopolitical structure of Iraq that, by design, could maintain the current geopolitical
borders and possibly contribute to stability in the Middle East. A qualitative approach
that examines the benefits of different models of government is used to identify themes
that may apply to the state of Iraq, Because adoption of any of the proposed options
depends on choices that must be made by the Iraqi government, this thesis presents only a
theoretical argument about the country’s likely future.
It is my contention that the most likely route to achieving long-term political
stability within Iraq is implementation of a federalist model of government that resembles
the Swiss model. The Swiss model provides a framework to create ethnic tolerance
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through specific power devolution, internal cooperation, and conflict resolution between
the different tribal and ethnic groups within each region, and external cooperation and
adjudication of issues between the regions and the central government.
This study’s results show that the different options analyzed all have positive and
negative characteristics. The three-region Swiss model provided an exceptional
framework and addressed a number of Iraq’s problems, but elements of the other models
could be implemented into the three-region model to create a more stable state. Further
analysis is needed to determine the best model of government to stabilize Iraq.
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Introduction
Borders, boundaries, and frontiers have played a critical role in the study of
political states by geographers and others over the past 100 years. Conflicts, such as war,
have constantly changed the world’s political map and its geopolitical structure, thereby
reinforcing the importance of borders in the political state system. Many political
geographers mark the beginning of nation-states and nationalism with the signing of the
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (Brunet-Jailly 2005; Glassner 1996). This treaty effectively
established the boundaries of England, France, Dutch-land, the German princedoms,
Muscovy, Poland, Turkey, Spain, and Sweden, and “began a radical reduction in the
number of States in Europe” (Glassner 1996, 64). War (both ideological and military) and
treaties would continue to reshape the world map over the next few centuries, but not
until World War I (WWI) would the world see the next major development of nationstates.
A reordering of states transpired post-WWI as new political states, which
previously existed as only nations of people, were formed after the fall of the Ottoman
and other empires. The world map grew from 55 states at the end of World War I to 165
states at the end of the Cold War in 1991, and to over 200 political states by 2014.
Regional alliances formed with economic, political, and security interests. Their actions
paved the way for more open economies with a common interest in spreading capitalism
as well as maintaining strategic alliances for both political and economic gain. Cohen
(2003, 54) theorized that the future world map could consist of over 250-275 political
entities, and he attributed the proliferation of states to the consequence of “the drive of
dependent territories for independence and the division of existing sovereign states.”
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Whatever the reasons, it is clear that the current geopolitical map could continue to
change well into the future.
The Middle East is a prime example of a region that could experience the
emergence of new nation-states in the near future. The region has been a hotbed of
Western political maneuvering for over a century, as more dominant powers used their
influence and geopolitical pressure to reshape the region. The West has been competing
for influence in the Middle East since the 19th century (Henry 2003), and the weak
economic infrastructure of the Ottoman Empire posed no barriers to Western penetration
(Ismael and Ismael 1999, 132). With the fall of the Ottoman Empire after WWI, the
political character of the Middle East became very different, as new geopolitical
boundaries were imposed on the region at the Conference of al-Aqir in 1922. During the
conference, the boundaries imposed by the British delineated the borders of Iraq, Kuwait,
and Nejad, thereby introducing the concept of territorial sovereignty to the region.
The League of Nations further aided the process of regional fragmentation by
creating a mandate system, which divided “the occupied territories of the defunct
Ottoman Empire into political entities with boundaries designed and drawn to perpetuate
political fragmentation in the face of Western economic and strategic interests” (Ismael
and Ismael 1999,134). The mandate system and the imposition of formal geopolitical
boundaries compounded an already present distrust of the Western powers by Arabs and
others in the region. The imposition of these geopolitical boundaries led to the separation
of multiple ethno-linguistic-religious groups, whose loyalties might be to the population
of a different country or be spread across multiple countries. This created a barrier to the
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political stability of the Middle Eastern regimes, which were already fragmented by
internal struggles for independence.
With the political state emergent as the dominant entity in the region “it also
enjoyed, early on, a legitimacy derived from the successful struggle against Western
Imperialism in its various forms” (Hudson 2002, 66). Pro-Western regimes began to fall
to nationalist-reformist movements “led by military officers and a professional, reformminded middle class” (Hudson 2002, 66). In order to bring legitimacy to these nationalist
state regimes, the leadership struggled to create a national-identity within the borders that
were created by the Western powers. The geopolitical boundaries set forth by the British
and the French became permanent fixtures in the Middle East and have shaped the
political identity of the region. The instability created by arbitrarily imposed political
borders has led to internal conflicts within these Middle East states and in the region as a
whole.
One of the most recent conflicts within the Middle East and North Africa has been
a political movement since 2010 known as the Arab Spring. This term was ascribed to a
series of pro-democratic movements that erupted after a Tunisian fruit vendor named
Mohamed Bouazizi “set himself on fire to protest the injustices of the status quo” (Ajami
2012, 57). The Arab uprisings moved like a political tsunami from North Africa through
the Middle East, eventually toppling or challenging the leadership in Tunisia, Algeria,
Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. Newly formed governments in several of these
countries further fragmented the region, and the future of the region remains in flux in the
aftermath of the events of the Arab Spring. It is clear that the diverse populations of the
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Middle East desire political and social change, and many commentators and analysts are
looking to Iraq to see if democracy is attainable and sustainable in the region.
Falling into a state of turmoil with the recent insurgent uprising in June, 2014, by
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Iraq’s status as a U.S.-proclaimed “stable
democracy” continues to complicate further geopolitical stability within the region. The
separation of ethno-linguistic-religious groups across geopolitical lines, which was a
result of Western colonialism post-WWI, continues to play a significant role in the future
of the country. After the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2011, Iraq was left to its own
devices to unify a country with three dominant ethno-linguistic-religious groups with
differing political agendas. Iraq’s current geopolitical struggle in the Middle East can be
characterized as an attempt to conduct consequence management as a result of the past
policies of Western powers. Iraq’s borders, like the rest of the borders in the Middle East,
follow no natural geographic features or ethnic-linguistic-religious lines. The Kurdish
population in the north is dispersed across Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria and consists of
Sunni and Shi’a Kurds. The Shi’a Arab population is spread across the border of Iran and
Iraq. The smallest segment of the population, Sunni Arabs, is primarily located in central
Iraq and across the borders of Jordan and Syria, and is intermixed with the Kurds to the
north and the Shi’a to the south. The result for Iraq has been a history of numerous
internal conflicts, as well as a series of regional wars that have driven the country to the
brink of political and economic failure.
As a political state, Iraq epitomizes the challenges of ethno-linguistic-religious
geopolitical diversity under one central government system. Failure to reach a stable
geopolitical solution within Iraq could lead to shockwaves among the various ethno-
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Research Approach
The goal of this thesis is to examine and analyze four options for the future
geopolitical structure of Iraq, which by design could preserve the current geopolitical
borders and possibly contribute to stability in the Middle East. Since Iraq has yet to
develop a political state that can foster a stable coalition supported by its multiple ethnolinguistic-religious groups, it is imperative that options for Iraq to develop into a stable
democracy are identified. Specifically, Iraq’s future as a functional political state is
dependent on its ability to withstand inward movements and outward influences, which
are focused on tearing apart the gains of the current political system. For Iraq to remain a
stable state, it would have to secure its borders and prevent insurgent groups from
conducting attacks against its populations, develop economic policies from which all
members of Iraqi society can benefit, and unite its people under an integrated political
system. Clearly, there are limited geopolitical solutions to the question of Iraq’s future
governance:
1. Iraq could maintain its current governance structure, defined by a relatively
ineffective central government;
2. Iraq could adopt a model of Federalism similar to the Swiss regional
government structure, with three key regions whose borders would be defined
along ethno-linguistic-religious lines;
3. Iraq could further decentralize into multiple regional governments (more than
three) with few internally binding characteristics;
4. Iraq could collapse into multiple semi-independent regions.
This thesis’ working argument is that the most likely route to achieving long-term
political stability within Iraq is solution two: the implementation of a federalist model of
government that resembles the Swiss model. The Swiss federal model can be
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characterized by the government’s ability to share and decentralize power with the Swiss
Cantons, while the federal government focuses on issues of external stability and
international relations. The Swiss model could allow Iraq to develop a central
government focused on internal and external stability, while also uniting its population to
repel external pressures and forces that are trying to destabilize the country. The Swiss
Model could allow Iraq to develop provinces, much like the Swiss Cantons, with a
significant amount of political autonomy to function as the necessary components to
create a stable internal political climate. The Swiss model could provide a framework for
developing a stronger sense of unity among Iraq’s ethno-linguistic-religious groups by
allowing them to maintain tribal, provincial, and state identities as demonstrated by the
three levels of Swiss citizenship in the current Swiss state. More importantly, the Swiss
model would enable Iraq to maintain its current internationally recognized borders, which
is likely the most acceptable solution to Iraq’s neighbors and the international
community.
While no geopolitically constructed model is a perfect answer to Iraq’s problems,
my hypothesis is that a Swiss-type federalist model could provide the most viable option
for future geopolitical stability within the country and the region. The Swiss model offers
the Iraqi people the ability to unify under the current internationally recognized territorial
boundaries of the country, and it offers a framework for creating autonomy arrangements
to address the issues and concerns of a multi-ethnic-linguistic-religious society. Not only
could this promote stability within the country but also throughout the Middle East
region. However, based on recent events, it is apparent that Iraq’s current government is
not yet capable of maintaining the structural integrity of the state. This has been
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demonstrated by its inability to prevent the advance of the insurgent Islamic State (ISIS),
which is taking control of Iraqi territory as well as persecuting and killing groups of
people within Iraq’s multi-cultural society. Ultimately, if Iraq proves unable to maintain
its current political structure with a strong central government, it is highly likely that the
state would collapse. This would create shockwaves throughout the Middle East and
force the international community to address the consequences of a failed state. Lastly,
should Iraq resort to the third model of government, characterized by decentralization of
power from the central government to multiple regional governments, it is possible that
the country could fragment into tribal regions and risk territorial collapse (model four)
due to the inability of the central government to maintain cohesion among the ethnolinguistic-religious groups, conceivably leading to secessionist movements and further
bloodshed. Thus, solution two seems to be the only viable option for Iraq’s territorial
future.
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Literature Review
Borders and boundaries are key elements in geopolitical conflict around the
world. Borders are zones of insecurity for all states as well as for nations of people. In an
effort to maintain current geopolitical borders, various types of political arrangements
have been executed throughout the world to satisfy the nationalism and autonomy
concerns of different groups. To better understand how borders and autonomy have
affected the geopolitical structure of the world, a review of border theory and
autonomous arrangements is crucial.
Borders
Glassner (1996, 71) argued that “all modern theories about states agree on one
thing: a State must have territory.” In order for a political state to have a clearly defined
territory, boundaries and borders must be demarcated. “When analyzing borders, it is
important to consider both the features used in the delineation of boundaries and the role
a border plays as a divider or promoter of exchange” (Reisser 2009, 233). Political
boundaries or borders in the contemporary sense are political creations and human
constructs. Borders may fall along natural or physical features, cultural fault lines, or be
arbitrary lines drawn on a map, but the final determination of the border and the
enforcement of that border are ultimately decided by government actions.
Early on, control of cities and territory was the primary concern of feudal
societies. Borders were not fixed places on maps, but described as borderlands or
frontiers separating different peoples. Geographers utilized mapping technology that
would allow rulers to view their land possessions spatially, and “these early works of
geographers and historians contributed to the formation of the modern political order”
(Brunet-Jailly 2005, 635). As mentioned earlier, the Treaty of Westphalia marked the
9

beginning of the modern nation-state, which, in turn, sparked the study of borders and
boundaries within the field of geography and other social sciences during the 19th and
20th centuries. As political geographers began studying borders, it became clear that there
were widely different views regarding the demarcation, function, role, and nature of
political borders. Much like the study of state formation, theorists such as Semple,
Hartshorne, and Jones played a defining role in the study of political borders (Hartshorne
1950).
Much of the literature in the early 20th century concerning borders emerged
during the two world wars or their aftermath, and “these studies were concerned with the
nature of boundaries in terms of their being ‘good’ or ‘bad’ from the military point of
view” (Minghi 1963, 408). For example, when the Sykes-Picot Agreement was reached
between Britain and France during WWI, the British government’s primary concern was
to create a buffer (France) between its Middle East interests and the Russians (Fromkin
2009). Agreements and treaties of this nature would shape the political landscape of
regions, specifically the Middle East, into the modern states that exist today.
Another common viewpoint during this time period was espoused by Holdich
(1916), who believed that boundaries served as barriers, and the best boundaries must be
physical features such as lakes, deserts, or mountains ( Minghi 1963). In contrast, Lyde
(1915) argued that boundaries should act positively, encouraging peaceful relations, and
he believed that boundaries should follow the paths of rivers as regional bonds. Many
other scholars argued against the use of straight-line boundaries and their inability to
demarcate the political state effectively. New theories then emerged to examine the
cultural characteristics of political boundaries as the relevant factor in boundary creation.
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One such theorist was geographer Isaiah Bowman (1928), who believed that lines of
nationality should be considered when creating borders, because “people were more
inclined to fight over issues of language, religion, and nationality than anything else”
(Reisser 2009, 243). This has become evident by the numerous conflicts within Africa
and the Middle East.
As the study of political boundaries matured, the criteria by which boundaries
were drawn became less important, and the functions that boundaries served elevated in
importance. For example, Spykman (Minghi 1963, 412) looked at drawing political
borders in terms of power, and his “ultimate objective was to have the new boundaries
drawn in such a way as to create states of equal strength.” Jones (Minghi 1963, 413)
argued that “the only good boundary will be the one that strengthens the power structure
of one’s own state.” Some analysts focused on the role of boundaries as barriers to
economic trade, while others argued that boundaries served as economic and social zones
of penetration. Despite the differences in border theory, both geographers and politicians
played a major role in the way that boundaries and borders were developed post-1945.
Contemporary literature has focused on the lessening importance of borders to the
political state, due to the impacts of globalization on the world economy. With advances
in communication and transport, political borders are perceived as nuisances to multinational corporations. Globalization has fostered the view that the free movement of
people, goods, information, and ideas across borders has weakened the role of political
states; however, Nichol and Minghi (2005, 680) argued that:
Although they are continually being transgressed by far-reaching networks
of people, capital and cultural connections, we have yet to see the national
territories, boundaries, and sovereignty give way to the impact of
globalizations.
11

Despite predictions that borders would become less important within a globalized
world economy, this has yet to occur in a geopolitical context. For example, it could be
argued that political states utilize globalization only as it benefits them, with borders
critical to that effort. Another point of view could be that, with the advancement of new
technologies, borders are more porous now than they were 50 years ago and thus require
greater control. Witness Chinese and other governments’ attempts to control access to
global electronic information. In reality, technology has enabled political states to
increase their ability to secure their borders more effectively through the utilization of
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), advanced optical and ground sensors, as well as
personnel scanning equipment.
Borders and Conflict
Identifying those political borders (both internal and external) more susceptible to
conflict is crucial to anticipating potential instability in regions and states. Based on the
high number of conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, it can be argued that borders
implemented within the developing regions by colonial powers are the most prone to
conflict today. The British and French were responsible for drawing nearly 40 percent of
the political borders outside Europe, and “excluding Europe, approximately 60 percent of
current envelopes [borders] are of external origin not having been drawn by the states
adjoining them today” (Foucher 2000, 160).
The Middle East and Africa are two regions most affected by the political borders
created by European powers. Populations of warring tribes and clans, as well as different
ethno-linguistic-religious groups, were incorporated into political territories, whose
borders were only as stable as the internal cohesion of their populations. Both Figure 2
12

Figure 2: Africa Ethnolinguistic Groups
Source: CIA (1996).
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Figure 3: Ethnic Groups of the Middle East
Source: Izady (2013).
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and Figure 3 effectively portray the ethno-linguistic groups separated by the modern
boundaries of Africa and the Middle East.
The mandate system, implemented at the conclusion of WWI, established the
borders of the modern Middle East in an attempt to manage the region politically to
satisfy Western interests. According to Ismael and Ismael (1999, 133):
This concept [implementation of borders] was not only culturally alien to
the tribal character of the area but also incompatible with the nature of the
interior land trade economy… These borders were not based on natural
geographic, ethnic, linguistic, or religious cleavages; they were political
facts, not geographic or demographic, and were part of Britain’s grand
design to preclude any unity of Arabs by creating rival but pro-Western
regimes in Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.
The instability created by the colonial powers led to internal conflicts within the Middle
East states and the region as a whole. More importantly, the separation of ethnolinguistic-religious groups across borders eventually would play a significant role in the
current conflicts within the country of Iraq.
Autonomy and Territorial Arrangements
Borders and conflict cannot be discussed without understanding the concept of
autonomy and territorial arrangements. “Whereas the creation of new states and largescale border readjustments once held primacy in dealing with minority national groups in
states, other tools, such as political autonomy within the state structure, are now
considered more often” (Reisser 2009, 235). Autonomy, in recent history, has been used
as a tool to settle internal as well as external territorial disputes that have been the result
of territorial losses and border implementation during post-war periods, as well as in
attempts to maintain current borders when faced with self-determination claims from
minority populations. Benedikter (2009, 18) identified four approaches to autonomy:
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1. Autonomy as a right to act upon one’s own discretion in certain
matters, whether the right is possessed by an individual or public body.
2. Autonomy as a synonym for more independence.
3. Autonomy as a synonym for decentralization.
4. Autonomy as a quality providing for exclusive powers of legislation,
administration and adjudication in certain areas” (see also Lapidoth
1997).
Put simply, autonomy is the right of people or nations to exercise control and oversee
specific aspects of their lives, whether they be personal, political, or cultural.
Furthermore, while no standardized definition for autonomy exists within the literature,
as a concept it is understood that three types of autonomy exist: personal (individuals’
right to make personal choices on religion and culture); functional or cultural
(“recognizes the distinct identity of minorities” and “fosters the preservation and further
development of that collective identity”); and territorial (refers to the “self-governance of
a demographically distinct territorial unit within the state”) (Weller and Nobbs 2010, 2-4;
Benedikter 2009).
Autonomy of nations within empires or nation-states is not a new concept.
Ancient and recently dissolved empires utilized internal territorial arrangements to avoid
opposition from subjugated communities to governance by a different ruling power.
According to Wolff (2010, 18):
As a tool of statecraft, autonomy has thus been a familiar, albeit not
excessively implemented, mechanism for at least the past two centuries,
one that always resulted in asymmetrical state designs. Yet, its
significance as a conflict-preventing and conflict-resolving arrangement
increased only over the course of the twentieth century.
Examples of autonomous and territorial arrangements throughout history include “a
number of provinces in the Ottoman empire, most prominently in the Balkans, but
16

extending to Egypt and Lebanon as well, the Austrian Kronländer, and, after the 1867
compromise, Hungary, in the Hapsburg empire, and Finland in the Russian empire for
most of the nineteenth century” (Wolff 2010, 18).
Autonomy and territorial arrangements increased in the twentieth century with the
dissolution of empires post-WWI, the gradual handover of sovereignty to newly created
nations in both Africa and the Middle East, as well as the dissolution of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) at the conclusion of the Cold War. As political
boundaries changed and were redrawn over the course of the last century, a rise in
nationalist and self-determination desires occurred as political ideologies became more
important and influential. Nations of people began to desire their own territory, which
created friction points across state borders and within states themselves. “Today, few
violent conflicts are between multiple states, but rather occur within states due to tensions
between state majorities, minority groups and peoples demanding respect for their
fundamental individual and collective rights” (Benedikter 2009, 9). Important examples
of these claims include the Kurdish population within Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, the multiple
ethnic groups in South Sudan, and the Ogoni of Nigeria.
Autonomy and territorial arrangements have proved to be effective political tools
to settle intrastate conflicts in non-violent ways, but the role of the state and its
willingness to share power plays a major role in the level of violence experienced when
minority groups seek autonomy and self-determination. A review of the literature
revealed that most of the successful autonomous arrangements have occurred within
Western Europe, while failed autonomous arrangements exist mostly in Africa and the
Middle East (e.g., Kurdish autonomy was consistently violated and withdrawn by Iraq
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under the rule of Saddam Husayn). Table 1 clarifies the differences between the various
territorial arrangements, and identifies states currently organized under specific
governmental structures.
Table 1: Autonomy Types
Government
Organization
Associated State

Condominium
Confederation

Reservation

Federation

Regionalist state

Dependent
Territory
Territorial
autonomy

Description of the Organization

Example States

A federal (treaty) where the smaller polity is
linked to a larger state. It has substantial
authority over its own affairs, but very little
influence in affairs of the larger state. Usually
either party may dissolve the relationship at any
time.

Cook Islands, Puerto
Rico

A polity that is jointly ruled by two authorities in a
way that permits substantial self‐rule.
A loose, but institutionalized cooperation of two
or more independent states without federal
constraints.
Form of self‐governance of a smaller people on a
given territory, with separate citizenship as a legal
member of the titular ethnic group of the
reservation and almost no participation to general
affairs of the state.
Two or more constituent entities enter into a
constitutional framework with common
institutions. Each member state retains certain
delegated powers and the central government
also retains powers over the member states.
A state with two levels of legislative powers,
central and regional, with the national parliament
retaining the sole legislative power over the
member states.
Political dependency, defined under the UN‐
Charter, Article 73, not considered as part of the
motherland or mainland of the governing state.
Particular, but integral parts of a political
sovereign state which have legislative and
executive powers entrenched by law. Specific
solution for one or more units of a state, but not
for the whole territorial state structure (except
Spain).

Andorra, New
Hebrides
European Union

Source: Created by the author from Benedikter (2009, 16)
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Navajo, Sioux, Hopi
(USA), Miqmaq
(Canada)

Belgium, Germany,
Switzerland, USA,
India, Brazil, Canada

Spain, Italy

Gibraltar, Virgin
Islands
Aaland Islands,
Gagauzia, Aceh,
Greenland

In many cases, autonomy is used synonymously with federalism and other
territorial arrangements. Benedikter (2009, 15) refers to this difference as a “blurring [of]
boundaries,” but, simply put, autonomy refers to a “specific part of the territory
[acquiring] a special status with specific characteristics,” as opposed to a federal structure
where provinces “enjoy the same powers and substantially the same degree of selfgovernment.” To better understand the differences between autonomy and territorial
arrangements, an examination of specific resolutions over time is warranted.
Territorial Autonomy
Territorial autonomy is the act of granting an ethnic or minority group its own
territory (under the umbrella of a sovereign state), as well as the power to guarantee the
survival of its cultural heritage and the protection of minority or ethnic rights (Benedikter
2009). Territorial autonomy does not give full independence to the group, but it does
provide executive and legislative powers, so members may manage their internal affairs
as defined in the autonomous arrangement. This form of autonomy has been utilized as
an instrument for settling self-determination conflicts.
One of the oldest and most-successful territorial autonomy arrangements, is the
arrangement between the Ǻaland Islands and Finland (Wolff 2010). The Ǻaland Islands
are a group of islands located between Sweden and Finland with a population that is both
linguistically and culturally Swedish. Ruled by Sweden for over 700 years, the islands
fell into Russian possession in 1809 and made part of the Grand Duchy of Finland in the
Russian Empire (Wolff 2010). In 1917, Finland seceded from the Russian Empire and
took with it the territory of the Ǻaland Islands. The initial response of the Ǻaland
population was to exercise a claim to self-determination and re-unification with Sweden.
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Finland rejected the Ǻaland claim, while Sweden fully supported the re-unification. The
dispute between Finland and Sweden would eventually be arbitrated by the League of
Nations without the Ǻaland population’s consultation. In 1920, Finland “recognized the
Ǻalanders’ right to maintain their culture, language and traditions and to enjoy a
demilitarized and autonomous status…[which under] the Autonomy Act of 1921
established the first official territory with autonomous status in Europe” (Benedikter
2009, 107).
The Ǻaland Islands developed a legislative body that deals with the internal,
political, and cultural matters of the islands, and this body is responsible for managing the
finances of the islands through its ability to levy taxes on the population. The Ǻaland
Islands do rely on the Finnish judicial system to settle legal issues up to the Supreme
Court. Finally, the Ǻaland Islands have a limited ability to propose treaties and approve
treaties that affect the islands at the international level. This is done through participation
in the Nordic Council, as well as via a representative to the European Union as part of the
Finnish delegation.
There were two revisions to the original autonomy act in 1951 and 1991. During
the revisions, the Ǻalanders’ autonomy was enhanced and its powers were further defined
and cemented; furthermore, the revisions also created a regional citizenship as well as a
provision for national symbols. Most importantly, both revisions ensured “that the
autonomous powers and status of the Ǻaland islands [under the Autonomy Act] cannot be
changed in any way without the consent of the Ǻalanders themselves [and the Ǻaland
Assembly]” (Wolff (2010, 28-32).
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The success of the Ǻaland Islands’ territorial autonomy arrangement with Finland
can be linked to “the gradual development of autonomy based on compromise [and
continued support] between the conflict parties” (Benedikter 2009, 111). More
importantly, the design of the autonomous arrangement allows for the evolution of the
arrangement between Finland’s central government and the Ǻaland Islands. The
willingness of both communities to work together is clearly the driving force behind the
stability of the territorial autonomous arrangement.
Regionalism and Regionalization
Regionalism or regionalization is an autonomous arrangement that has been used
successfully to resolve ethnic conflicts within multi-ethnic states. A regional state is a
territorial power-sharing arrangement where a state has “two levels of legislative powers,
central and regional, with the national parliament retaining the sole legislative power on
national and constitutional level” (Benedikter 2009, 16). According to Schrijver (2005,
275):
Various arguments for implementing regionalisation have been given,
from resolving ‘overloading’ of the centralised state, and improving
democracy and political participation to incentives of European
integration. In many instances, making an arrangement to deal with
demands of regionalist movements has been among the reasons for
regionalisation.
Spain began a process of regionalization in an effort to democratize after the postFranco transition in the late 1970s, and its efforts at decentralization resulted in a system
of government resembling a federal state, but with regions having different levels of
autonomy and power. Spain is often referred to as a federation in disguise; however, the
word federal is not utilized in the Constitution or successive legislation (Moreno 2011;
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Benedikter 2009). Spanish politicians and citizens refer to Spain as the “Estado de las
Autonomías” or State of Autonomous Regions.
Initially, the Basques, Catalonians, and the Galicians were recognized as three
historic nationalities under the 1978 Constitution. These three communities, along with
14 other communities, participated in the process of regionalization from 1978 to 1983,
resulting in 17 communities with different levels of autonomy. The framers of the
Constitution left the questions of regional autonomy up to the various historical and
cultural groups within the country. If the groups opted to become an autonomous
community “they had to choose which powers, listed in the constitution, they wanted to
be in charge of” (Benedikter 2009, 82).
The central government exercises control over some aspects of the autonomous
communities, such as “the organization of justice as well as all procedural, criminal, and
commercial legislation” (Moreno and Colino 2010, 311). The autonomous communities
control sectors of culture and language policy, tourism, health and social services,
education, agriculture, territorial planning, and public infrastructure. Where conflict
arises over aspects of control, the central state retains authority; however, disagreements
can be brought before the Constitutional Court of Spain for arbitration.
Spain’s government continues to be successful in dealing with internal conflict
through its system of regionalization and, interestingly, many of Spain’s citizens see
themselves as having a dual identity both with their region and the country. A 2002
survey suggested that over 78% of the population viewed itself as both Spanish and a part
of an autonomous community (e.g., both Catalonian and Spanish) (Moreno 2011). This
duality illustrates the success of regionalization efforts by Spain to accommodate the
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large plurality in society and the willingness of the citizens to accept the regional state
form of government. Furthermore, “developments elsewhere [outside of Spain], such as
the complete regionalization of the Belgian political party system, also suggest that the
introduction of regional autonomy might add to the containment of separatism” [which
Spain has seemed to accomplish with the Basque community] (Schrijver 2005, 284).
Federalism
Federalism and autonomy are often used synonymously. What needs to be
understood is there are aspects of autonomy within federal states. More specifically, there
are autonomous arrangements that occur under federal systems or states. Much like
autonomy, federalism has become one of the go-to proposals for resolving conflicts in
multi-ethnic states. “The theoretical justification is that it is possible for federal systems
to combine self-rule with shared rule, leaving the federal state intact while recognizing
territorial ethnic groups” (Iff 2013, 228).
What is interesting about federalism is that no two federal states are alike, and no
state conforms to the perfect federal model. Federal states can be either symmetrical or
asymmetrical. In a symmetrical federal state, “the scheme of power sharing affects all
constituent units of the state,” as opposed to asymmetrical federations where “one or
more regions (federated states) are vested with special powers not granted to other
provinces” (Benedikter 2009, 14). What is common in all federal states is a sharing or
decentralization of power, whereby the central government shares or devolves power to
the regional governments. Typical power-sharing arrangements can range from education
and religious freedoms to more specific government functions such as levying taxes,
health care management, and internal security.
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that was essentially an alliance between individual sovereign states that shared common
values on democracy. The current federal arrangement resulted from a Swiss Civil War.
According to Fleiner and Hertig (2010, 322):
The federal structure was a compromise reached after a religiously
motivated civil war (the Sonderbund war) that opposed the Protestant
cantons – which, influenced by French liberalism, favoured a centralized
liberal state – against the conservative Catholic cantons, which advocated
a confederal arrangement.
The constitution developed at the end of the civil war addressed the need to develop a
governmental system based on autonomy and shared power, with the individual cantons
creating a heavily decentralized state. The merits of the Swiss federal model exist in the
relationship between the central government and the cantons. Within the Swiss federal
model, the central government devolved power to the Cantons, which, in turn, further
devolved power to their municipalities. This is a long-standing tradition, and it has
resulted in municipalities with different predominant languages and religion. Switzerland
also recognizes three levels of citizenship: “every Swiss national simultaneously holds a
federal, cantonal, and municipal citizenship, each of which reflects one of the three
complementary identities” (Fleiner and Hertig 2010, 322).
The Swiss Constitution established a unique federal government. The Federal
Council consists of seven members of equal power elected by the Federal Assembly. The
Federal Assembly is composed of two chambers, the upper house and the lower house.
The upper house represents the cantons, while the lower house represents the Swiss
people. Each house is elected by the people. The Constitution has gone through two
revisions since 1848. All amendments made to the Constitution, as well as the approval
of new constitutions, have to be voted on by the Swiss people and the majority of the
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cantons. The Swiss Constitution provides the cantons with organizational freedom of
their regional governments, but all the cantons have “opted for a collegial political
system” (Fleiner and Hertig 2010, 335). Most cantons have a unicameral parliament
elected through a proportional voting system. To manage diversity, the cantons have
conferred power and autonomy to their municipalities, which is protected by the federal
Constitution. Cantons have the ability to manage and promote their own economic
development through their ability to levy taxes on their populations. In addition, the
federal Constitution provides guidelines for fiscal equality among the cantons, which, in
turn, the cantons provide for the municipalities. The cantons have the ability to determine
their own official language as well as define the language that their education systems
will utilize. In the arena of healthcare, the federal government, as well as the canton, has
constitutional responsibility; however, “the implementation of health policy, the
prevention of disease, and the regulation, accreditation, and largely also the financing of
hospitals lie with the cantons” (Fleiner and Hertig 2010, 342).
The devolution of power from the federal government to the cantons and further
to the municipalities applies in various other arenas of the Swiss federal system. It is
through the devolution of power and shared political ideals that the government
overcomes the diversity and political conflicts that arise. The Swiss federal model
represents a unique arrangement compared to other federal systems, where “a political
culture [based on federalism and direct democracy] has been established that seems to
hold the fragmented nation together” (Fleiner 2002, 123). This model of federalism may
be applicable for other multi-cultural states seeking to develop a democracy based
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system, while also maintaining autonomy in their cultural, religious, and linguistic
character.
Failed Attempts of Federalism
While federalism has been touted as a grand solution to the settlement of conflict
in multi-ethnic states, in recent history there have been failed attempts to implement
federalism successfully. McGarry and O’Leary (2011, 191) argued that:
multinational federalism or multi-ethnic federations which have either
broken down, or failed to remain democratic, have been largely in the
communist world or the post-colonial world.
Examples of failed federations throughout the world include the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Nigeria. The circumstances through which these failed
federations were created and later governed were the reason for their disintegration or
failed stability; however, their failure doesn’t mean federalism is unattainable in multiethnic societies. Switzerland and India are prime examples of federal states that have
remained cohesive entities, but this is due, in large part, to their governmental structure as
well as to their implementation of federal principles. It must also be noted that
Switzerland and India have not been without internal conflict, yet the growth, maturation,
and reorganization of their federal systems have been instrumental to their enduring
success.
When examining failed federations, McGarry and O’Leary (2011) identify that
numerous federations have failed to be successfully established or failed to remain
democratic in the post-colonial world to include former colonies in the Caribbean (the
West Indies Federation), the continent of Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria and Tanzania)
and the continent of Asia (Indochina, Burma, and Pakistan). McGarry and O’Leary
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(2011, 192) further state that “new multinational federations appear not to work as
conflict-regulating devices – even where they allow a degree of minority selfgovernment.” This proves to be a disturbing argument, especially in the case of Iraq,
which is currently undergoing an internal struggle between its multiple ethno-linguisticreligious groups. If post-colonial federations are more prone to failure, then Iraq’s future
as a state is in jeopardy. A deeper look at failed federal models in multi-ethnic societies is
warranted to understand the dilemmas these countries face post-colonial rule.
Nigeria provides an excellent case study for a model of government in the postcolonial world that has failed to remain resilient and democratic in governance. The first
Nigerian Federation (1960–1966) was a British generated model based on the “1954
British colonial Lyttelton Constitution” (Suberu 2010, 229). The first federation consisted
of three regions separated by the three predominant ethnic groups within the country.
This federal model lasted until 1966, when a military coup took control of the country
due to “contradictions and imbalances built into the tri-regional colonial federal legacy”
(Suberu 2005, 142). Military rule lasted from 1966 until 1979. During this period, the
three original regions of the first federal system were subdivided, first, into 12 constituent
states and later into 19 states. This process subdivided the three major ethnic groups. As
Suberu (2010, 229) stated:
This was a process of political and economic centralization mounted by
Nigeria’s politicized soldiers in order to contain the centrifugal pressures
that had destabilized the First Republic and contributed to the outbreak of
civil war.
Nigeria experienced three more phases of rule following the first military rule
from 1966-1979. The Second Republic lasted from 1979-1983, followed by a period of
military rule from 1984-1999. During the second and third phases of rule, Nigeria further
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subdivided it states from 19 to 36. While this subdued ethnic and regional divisiveness,
the government became highly centralized and rampant with political corruption. The
current federal structure, the Fourth Republic, has been in place from1999 to the present.
Both corruption and centralization still exist under the Fourth Republic, as well as
widespread discrimination. “Nigeria is so centralized that it has been described as a
‘hollow federation’ and ‘a unitary state in federal guise’” (McGarry and O’Leary 2011,
193), and “corruption and abuse of power are so pervasive that the rule of law can hardly
be said to exist” (Suberu 2001; McGarry and O’Leary 2011, 193).
The failure of Nigeria to remain a democratic federation is not surprising. The
first federal model was an imbalanced decentralist attempt at creating three ethnically
diverse provinces within the country. This model was created by the British prior to
Nigeria’s independence, and its foundation did not take into account the possibility of
secession of the three principle ethnic groups. It was only through military force that the
country’s borders remained solvent. The later forms of government were created to
politically fragment the three principle ethnic groups within the country “to eliminate the
existence of a core or geopolitically hegemonic regions” (Suberu 2010, 232). This created
competition and discrimination among the provinces further fragmenting the unity of the
country.
Nigeria’s climb to become Africa’s number one oil producer further complicated
the country’s federal development. Suberu (2010, 234) noted that:
Aside from fueling the inter-regional conflict between resource-rich and
resource-constrained regions and stimulating political corruption,
Nigeria’s oil-centric economy has aborted the country’s initial hope of
broad-based economic development in agriculture.
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Nigeria’s oil wealth has led to a polarization of the country’s economy and further fueled
political corruption. A clear distinction exists between the oil rich region and the rest of
the country, and more importantly, the oil economy has not provided social or economic
opportunities in the federation (Suberu 2010).
Nigeria’s current governmental model has been successful at keeping ethnic
conflict in check; however, its government has failed to reach a federal solution to further
promote democracy to counter-act its over-centralization of power or to successfully
utilize profits from oil production to promote socio-economic parity within the country’s
provinces. These political-economic issues complicate Nigeria’s connotation as a federal
model of government. Interestingly, the parallels that exist between Nigeria and Iraq are
astonishing. Analysis of these similarities should prove beneficial when analyzing
solutions to Iraq’s current governmental and political shortcomings, hopefully, providing
insight to create a federal model that will allow Iraq to endure as a political state.
Failed or Fragile States:
There has been extensive literature regarding failed and fragile states within
recent history. According to Di John (2010, 10), as well as Cramer (2006), “this interest
has been largely sparked by the urgency of understanding the factors behind political
violence and civil war, and the growth of terrorist organizations in many less-developed
countries.” The definition of failed state has evolved over the last quarter century and has
been redefined numerous times within the literature. Jabareen (2013, 111-112) postulated
the following:
The failed state therefore emerges as a concept representing a set of
negative qualities possessed by states: states that are apprehensive, deeply
conflicted, dangerous, divided, fragmented, and insecure; states that have
no political legitimacy, provide only limited political goods, and lack
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democracy and an independent judiciary system; states that pose a
supreme threat to global security and a safe-haven for terrorists and their
organizations; states that pose a threat to the flow of neoliberal economic
globalization; states that are corrupt and that provide strongholds for drug
and arms traders, money launderers, and smugglers; states with pervasive
economic inequalities and declining GDPs; states in which loyalties,
security, and trust are based not on modern institutions but rather on
kinship and tribal and sectarian systems.
While this appears to be an all-inclusive definition, it must be noted that not all states will
embody all of these characteristics. Furthermore, existence of one or more of these
characteristics within a state does not necessarily mean that state has failed. The analysis
of a state’s total characteristics is necessary to determine fragility or failure, and the
Failed States Index has attempted to do that for the last decade.
The Failed States Index, recently renamed the Fragile States Index, attempts to
apply a statistical methodology to determine the most fragile states by analyzing twelve
primary social, economic, and political indicators. Table 2 lists and defines these twelve
indicators and identifies the pressures and measures associated with each. Utilizing
special software known as the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), data are
analyzed and then “converted into a score representing the significance of each of the
various pressures for a given country,” with further analysis performed to ensure that the
raw data have not been misinterpreted (GFP 2014, 1). What is important to note is that
many post-colonial countries, whose borders were drawn by European powers, are
located in the highest categories of fragile states, especially in the case of Africa and the
Middle East. It can be argued that not only are the borders created by European powers
most prone to conflict, but the states themselves are some of the most unstable or fragile
in the world.

31

Table 2: Fragile States Index Indicators
Social Indicators
Demographic Pressures
Pressures on the population such as disease and natural disasters make it
difficult for the government to protect its citizens or demonstrate a lack of
capacity or will.
Includes pressures and measures related to:
-Natural Disasters
-Malnutrition
-Disease
-Water Scarcity
-Environment
-Population Growth
-Pollution
-Youth Bulge
-Food Scarcity
-Mortality

Refugees and IDPs
Pressures associated with population displacement. This strains public
services and has the potential to pose a security threat.
Includes pressures and measures related to:
-Displacement
-Refugees per capita
-Refugee Camps
-IDPs per capita
-IDP Camps
-Absorption capacity
-Disease related to
Displacement

Group Grievance
When tension and violence exists between groups, the state’s ability to
provide security is undermined and fear and further violence may ensue.
Includes pressures and measures related to:
-Discrimination
-Communal Violence
-Powerlessness
-Sectarian Violence
-Ethnic Violence
-Religious Violence

Human Flight and Brain Drain
When there is little opportunity, people migrate leaving a vacuum of
human capital. Those with resources also often leave before, or just as,
conflict erupts.
Includes pressures and measures related to:
-Migration per capita
-Emigration of
-Human Capital
Educated population

Economic Indicators
Uneven Economic Development
When there are ethnic, religious, or regional disparities, the government
tend to be uneven in their commitment to the social contract.
Includes pressures and measures related to:
-GINI Coefficient
-Urban-Rural Service
-Income Share of
Distribution
Highest 10%
-Access to improved
-Income Share of
Services
Lowest 10%
-Slum Population

Poverty and Economic Decline
Poverty and economic decline strain the ability of the state to provide
for its citizens if they cannot provide for themselves and can create
friction between the “haves” and the “have nots”.
Includes pressures and measures related to:
-Economic Deficit
-Purchasing power
-Government Debt
-GDP per capita
-Unemployment
-GDP Growth
-Youth Employment
-Inflation

Political and Military Indicators
State Legitimacy
Corruption and a Lack of representativeness in the government directly
undermine the social contract.
Includes pressures and measures related to:
-Corruption
-Level of Democracy
-Government
-Illicit Economy
Effectiveness
-Drug Trade
-Political
-Protests and
Participation
Demonstrations
Electoral Process
-Power Struggles

Public Services
The provision of health, education, and sanitation services, among
others, are key roles of the state.
Includes pressures and measures related to:
-Policing
-Quality Healthcare
-Criminality
-Telephony
-Education Provision
-Internet Access
-Literacy
-Energy Reliability
-Water & Sanitation
-Roads
-Infrastructure

Human Rights and Rule of Law
When human rights are violated or unevenly protected, the state is failing
in its ultimate responsibility.
Includes pressures and measures related to:
-Press Freedom
-Incarceration
-Civil Liberties
-Religious
-Political Freedoms
Persecution
-Human Trafficking
-Torture
-Political Prisoners
-Executions

Security Apparatus
The security apparatus should have a monopoly the use of legitimate
force. The social contract is weakened where this is affected by
competing groups. Includes pressures and measures related to:
-Internal Conflict
-Military Coups
-Small Arms
-Rebel Activity
Proliferation
-Militancy
-Riots and Protests
-Bombings
-Fatalities from
-Political Prisoners
Conflict

Fractionalized Elites
When local and national leaders engage in deadlock and brinksmanship
for political gain, thus undermines the social contract.
Includes pressures and measures related to:
-Power Struggles
-Political
-Defectors
Competition
-Flawed Elections

External Intervention
When the state fails to meet its international or domestic obligations,
external actors may intervene to provide services or to manipulate
internal affairs.
Includes pressures and measures related to:
-Foreign Assistance
-Foreign Military
-Presence of
Intervention
Peacekeepers
-Sanctions
-Presence of UN Missions -Credit Rating

Source: Created by the author using data from GFP (2014).
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Iraq currently is ranked 13 on the Fragile States Index. Iraq has been on the index
since 2005, reaching as high as second in 2007. It could be debated that, had the recent
conflict with ISIS begun sooner, analysts would have placed Iraq higher on the index. It
must be noted that Iraq has been a fragile state for much of its existence, and examination
of Iraq’s history is necessary to determine how it has evolved into this failed/fragile state
status.
Iraq was created from the three Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra
at the conclusion of WWI. These three provinces had never been governed as one
cohesive unit, and the merging of these three provinces would prove problematic from
Iraq’s inception until the present day. “Of all the Ottoman provinces in the Middle East,
those in Iraq had demonstrated a strong resistance to centralized rule… [and] the region
was also one of the least developed in the empire” (Abdullah 2011, 93). Britain was at the
heart of the creation of Iraq, which was an outcome of the Sykes-Picot agreement at the
conclusion of WWI. Britain’s interest in Iraq as a state was a political, strategic, and
economic decision, indicative of the formation of the rest of the Middle East.
In an attempt to unify Iraq under a trusted agent, Britain installed King Feisal as
the constitutional monarch of Iraq. A Sunni Arab, Feisal was not native to the original
three provinces and his installation as monarch placed him in direct rule over multiple
ethno-linguistic-religious groups, including Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs, Kurds, Christians,
Jews, Yazidis, and Turks. The imposition of a Sunni Arab leader would lead to an
eventual Sunni Arab-dominated government, in which an ethnic group that made up
approximately 20 percent of the state’s multi-cultural population would rule the country
for the remainder of the 20th century.
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Despite the lop-sided rule of the Sunni elite over the rest of the Iraqi population,
the monarchy did provide a period of stability for the state of Iraq. There were periods of
dissent from various ethnic groups such as the Kurds, but the monarchy quickly
dispatched these uprisings. Under the monarchy, “the state’s institutions were refined, the
country’s borders clarified, material development progressed, national integration
deepened and a new educated cadre came to hold important positions” (Abdullah 2011,
116). Despite these great achievements, there was a clear social polarization between the
land-owning elite and the peasantry. Additionally, “the narrow base of the regime
alienated the country’s growing number of educated middle classes, who aspired to a
greater share of power and wealth” (Abdullah 2011, 117). The monarchy would
eventually fall to a military coup led by General Abdul-Karim Qasim on 14 July, 1958.
The 1958 coup was orchestrated by a group of Iraqi military officers who had
formed a secret organization named the Free Officers of Iraq. These officers based their
coup on the liberation of the people of Iraq from the imperial puppet government of the
monarchy. “The republic replaced the monarchy with a three-man Sovereignty Council
taking the responsibilities of the president until such time as national elections could be
held” (Abdullah 2011, 119). The first two years of the republic saw an increase in
nationalism and the implementation of various reforms to include limiting the power of
religious courts, urban development, land distribution, spending on social welfare
programs, and investment in industry; however, an opposition bloc formed within the
country and eventually exploited the differences between the Free Officers (Abdullah
2011). The instability created by the opposition bloc, failed coup attempts, as well as the
war between the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Kurds, eventually led to a repressive
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government headed by Qasim. In turn, Qasim would later be overthrown by the Ba’thist
party, with the help of a non-Ba’thist Army Officer, Abdul-Salam Arif. Arif’s military
government pursued a policy of rapid nationalization of industry, which eventually led to
the stagnation of the Iraqi economy. His death in 1966 led to another coup by the Ba’thist
party and the eventual dictatorship of Saddam Husayn.
Under Ba’thist rule, the party’s ideology would be forced onto the population, so
that “by the end of the 1970s, the distinction between party and government was blurred”
(Abdullah 2011, 131). “The Ba’thist regime politicized the differences between Iraq’s
communities through discrimination and ethnic favouritism” (Bouillon 2012, 283). NonBa’thists would be persecuted and were unable to hold positions in government and
education. The population was under constant surveillance by Saddam’s security
services, and dissent against the government was dealt with through torture and
executions (Abdullah 2011; Marr 2012). In 1979, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr resigned as the
leader of Iraq, which led to the establishment of a totalitarian government led by Saddam
Husayn.
Saddam Husayn would further destabilize the country over the course of the next
two decades, but his regional politics would elevate Iraq to one of the most powerful
regional players in the Middle East. Saddam’s dictatorship persecuted non-Ba’thist
citizens as well as the Shi’a and Kurdish populations in Iraq, and he used chemical
weapons against his own population to prevent them from rising up against his
government. Saddam also committed his military to multiple regional conflicts, including
a war with Iran, which lasted from 1980-1988, followed by war with Kuwait (the Gulf
War) in 1990, which was quickly ended with U.S. military assistance. The Iraq-Iran War,
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the Gulf War, international sanctions, and internal uprisings damaged and weakened the
state and the “cohesiveness of the nation” (Marr 2012, 254). Ultimately, the dictator’s
repressive regime and a change in U.S. foreign policy due to the terrorist attacks in
September, 2001, eventually led to the invasion by U.S. Forces in 2003 and the fall of
Saddam Husayn’s government.
Iraq’s current instability is a result of multiple factors over the history of the
state’s existence. Imperialism and Western interests post-WWI, military coups in the
mid-20th century and, finally, a ruthless dictatorship created deep divisions within the
country’s population. The U.S. invasion in 2003 and the overthrow of Saddam Husayn’s
regime further destabilized the country to the point of complete state failure. The
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) established by the U.S. to govern the post-Saddam
Iraq, and the policies and decisions made by the CPA during its tenure, played a direct
role in destabilizing the already fragile state. “Ignorance led to numerous ill-advised
decisions, and one of the most fateful was the order to abolish the army and the Ba’th
Party” (Abdullah 2011, 163). The de-Ba’thification of Iraq effectively eliminated the
Iraqi Bureaucracy and disbanded the military, bringing further disorder to the country.
“More troubling, however, was that this campaign directed against the Ba’th regime’s
foundations came to be viewed as a campaign against Sunni Arabs in general, adding fuel
to the growing sectarian divide” (Abdullah 2011, 163).
Sectarian rifts proved to be a major hurdle for the remainder of the U.S.
occupation. Elections were held, with politicians clearly elected along sectarian lines.
Many Sunni’s refused to participate in the creation of the Iraqi Constitution, which led to
more control and favorable policies towards the Shi’a and Kurdish communities.
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Sectarian violence erupted in Iraq, killing thousands of Iraqis and creating large numbers
of refugees. “The sectarian strife penetrated state institutions as the embryonic Iraqi
security forces came to be divided into Sunni and Shi’i sections, each used to target the
opposite community” (Abdullah 2011, 171-172). Additionally, insurgent groups based
along sectarian lines further destabilized the government, creating havoc in Sunni and
Shi’a communities.
According to Marr (2012), stabilization started to materialize in 2007 due to three
main factors:
1. The U.S. government authorized a surge of 50,000 troops to Iraq, whose
mission was to protect the Iraqi population. This new strategy fostered support
for the U.S. troops and turned Iraqi citizens against the insurgency;
2. A movement known as the Sahwa (Awakening) emerged, and Sunni tribes
turned against the al-Qa’ida insurgency;
3. The Shi’a insurgency in the south began to fracture, due to a political split
between Maliki, the Iraqi Prime Minister, and the Sadrists.
These three factors, along with governmental and economic reforms, and a strengthening
of the central government led to a brief stabilization of the Iraqi state and the eventual
withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2011; however, Iraq would face a new threat in 2014 from
an insurgent group known as ISIS.
The ISIS Advance:
In June, 2014, ISIS attacked and seized control of Mosul and Tikrit in the
northwest region of Iraq. Primarily an ethnically Sunni region, ISIS encountered little
resistance until its advance was countered by Kurdish forces. ISIS has critically
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destabilized Iraq in recent months by taking territory and displacing elements of the Iraqi
population and the Iraqi security forces. This has highlighted a clear lack of competency
by the Iraqi security forces, as well as the inability of the current Iraqi government to
protect its population adequately from external and internal threats. The government of
Iraq has requested U.S. intervention to assist Iraqi security forces in combating ISIS but,
even with U.S. airstrikes currently underway, ISIS is still advancing throughout Syria and
Iraq (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Map of ISIS-Controlled Areas and Coalition Air Strikes
Source: ISW (2014).
“ISIS’ stated goal is to restore the ‘caliphate’ – an Islamic state under the rule of a
community of religious scholars guided by a supreme leader, the caliph or khalifah,
which is generally taken to mean the successor of the Prophet Muhammad” (Johnson
2014, 1). The first caliph was established after the death of Muhammad, and the role of
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the caliph has been the political, military, spiritual, and administrative leader of all
Muslims. During the caliphate period, the Muslim culture flourished and excelled in the
development of math, science, and art. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire post-WWI,
the first President of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal, abolished the caliphate. Thereafter, the
Middle East states attempted to advance state and Arab nationalism as opposed to Islamic
unity, and this contributed to the development of Islamic Fundamentalist movements with
the goal of restoring the caliphate in the Middle East (Eichenwald 2014).
ISIS is not a new organization, and its roots are founded in the Abu Mus’ab al
Zarqawi’s Islamic fundamentalist group Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (more commonly
known as Al Qaeda in Iraq). Breaking from Al Qaeda due to ideological differences, the
group evolved and merged with a Syrian organization, thus forming the current Islamic
State. With extremist ideology based on bringing about the return of the caliphate to the
Middle East and North Africa, ISIS militants have killed hundreds of civilians who
refused to accept ISIS beliefs or convert to its form of Islam, with females and children
sold into the sex trade. This is true of the Yezidi population as well as elements of the
Kurdish population in Iraq and Syria. ISIS’ advancement into and control over both Iraqi
and Syrian territory have created a fissure of instability in the Middle East, and it is clear
that, if Iraq does not successfully repel ISIS, the country could be fractured to the point of
disintegration.
ISIS has already claimed the establishment of a caliphate in Iraq and Syria. In
attempt to legitimize the organization, ISIS has developed a system of governance,
opened closed roads, restored electricity, and started paying municipal workers. In
addition, ISIS has established a presence through an online newspaper and social media.
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The problem with maintaining these systems boils down to financial stability of the
organization. ISIS is funded through the sale of illegal crude from captured oil fields,
bank robbery, and crude taxation methods in controlled territories. ISIS’ ability to
establish and sustain a caliphate is dependent on future income. Some believe that ISIS
will not be able to sustain itself and its governance of a caliphate economically (CarusoCabrera 2014). Without the ability to continue to pay workers and provide essential
services, the likelihood of ISIS staying in control of its seized territory is minimal.
Another roadblock to ISIS’ stability is its lack of support from Islamic leaders and
the Muslim population. ISIS killing of innocent Muslims has discredited the organization
and created opposition within the Islamic community. Islamic religious leaders have
publicly criticized ISIS for its brutal tactics and establishment of what they describe as a
false caliphate. The killing of innocent Muslims has also created an opposition movement
in the ISIS-controlled territory of western Iraq. The Sunni Arab region of Iraq, where
ISIS made its quickest military victories, has already begun to participate in operations to
expel ISIS. The Sunni Arabs have requested U.S. assistance in countering ISIS militants
in western Iraq, while the Kurdish peshmerga forces, Shi’a militias, and Iraqi security
forces have been fighting ISIS militants in north and central Iraq. It will be difficult for
ISIS to maintain its territorial control, especially if an Iraqi coalition develops to expel
the ISIS militants from the state.
ISIS also faces the possibility of intervention by other Middle East states.
Currently, most states, including Jordan and Saudi Arabia, have taken up a defensive
posture. Iran has taken a more active role in assisting the Iraqi government with support
to battle the ISIS militants. If the ISIS threat appears to be gaining ground outside of Iraq
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and Syria, the prospect of military action is highly likely, which would make it extremely
difficult for ISIS to maintain its foothold in Iraq.
Finally, while the permanent envelopment of Iraq into an ISIS caliphate is
unlikely, the destabilization of Iraq created by the ISIS could lead to the possible
disintegration of the state in its current structure. It is crucial that Iraq overcomes
sectarian tensions and presents a unified front against ISIS. If the Shi’a-led Iraqi
government cannot incorporate the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs into a coalition effort to
expel ISIS, the risk exists that Iraq could disintegrate into a group of micro-states,
creating significant instability in the region.
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Methodology
The goal of the analysis is to examine three hypothesized models of government
to determine a best-case model for the future stability of Iraq. This thesis utilizes a
qualitative and policy driven approach to examine the relationship between the colonialimposed borders of Iraq and the state-building required to create a viable political entity
within the current geopolitical borders. Previous research notes that there is a negative
relationship between borders imposed by colonial powers in the developing world and
political-territorial stability; however, the implementation of the principle of Uti
Possidetis Juris in decolonized regions of the world, including South America and
Africa, has led to international acceptance of stabilizing decolonized countries by using
colonial borders as geographical limits (Fromkin 2009, Vahlas 2013). This study applies
these observations to the case of Iraq to determine what models of government might
ensure the future viability of the geopolitical state within its current borders.
Qualitative research is utilized during this analysis due to the type of geopolitical
solutions being proposed. When examining multiple ethno-linguistic-religious groups
within one country, utilizing qualitative analysis to understand human behavior is
necessary when determining the feasibility of a geopolitical model of government. More
importantly, the conclusions reached during this research may only have applicability to
the state of Iraq due to the specific characteristics and multi-cultural dynamics present
within the state. The qualitative design of this research allows for the identification of
themes within the literature through the analysis of similar case studies and policy
initiatives to employ federalism as a tool for conflict management in multi-cultural states.
Furthermore, it would be difficult to identify data sets that might capture effectively the
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human dynamics necessary to identify which model of government best complements
needs of the people of Iraq. This is why a quantitative approach is not being utilized to
test the proposed geopolitical solutions. If the thesis were looking to answer a more
specific question - such as, what model of government do the people of Iraq desire - then
a quantitative approach would be warranted.
This analysis takes place in three stages:
1. Deconstruction of the human context of Iraq by examining the population,
political culture, economy, and the centrifugal/centripetal forces within the
state;
2. Review of the territorial policy debates in Iraq, both internal and regional
issues, that have shaped and continue to shape Iraq’s political climate; and
3. Proposal of three models for maintaining the current borders of Iraq through
examples of state models that could work to unite the country’s diverse
populations.
The first stage of this study focuses on the deconstruction of the complex human
spatial components of Iraq. This stage outlines the population’s cultural and political
differences and examines the country’s economic activity in order to establish a framework for the research. Most studies of the political state, as noted by Hartshorne (1950),
focus on the centrifugal forces within states that create political instability. Hartshorne
(1950) believed that too much emphasis has been placed on forces that divide or disrupt
political states, and that more focus should be placed on the centripetal forces that
continue to bind the state. Consisting of multiple ethno-linguistic-religious groups, Iraq’s
population dynamics have been studied by scholars across multiple disciplines.
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Specifically, scholars have examined the political, spatial, and communal relationships as
well as the social interactions between the Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurdish populations.
Through these studies, a firm understanding of Iraq’s centripetal and centrifugal forces
has been established. Like Hartshorne’s (1950) functional theory approach, the intent of
stage one’s analysis is to determine which centripetal forces Iraq has available to
maintain the current borders. A comparative analysis of the centripetal forces in relation
to the centrifugal forces must also be provided to determine the viability of the future
geopolitical state. The utilization of maps in stage one to identify the spatial dimensions
of each ethno-linguistic-religious group as well as the tribal groups helps in understanding the population dynamics within the country, as well as the centripetal and
centrifugal forces that exist.
The second stage of analysis examines the current territorial policy debates and
discussions relating to Iraq and the Middle East. Iraq’s current geopolitical boundaries are
a major factor in the stability of the Middle East region. A wide array of literature and
commentary has been published in relation to Iraq’s internal and external political borders
and the creation of three micro-states as a solution to Iraq’s sectarian divide. This stage
applies this body of literature to examine the principle of Uti Possidetis Juris and the
territorial debates both internal and external to Iraq. Furthermore, insight is provided on
why it is important to maintain the current geopolitical borders of Iraq by exploring the
impacts of border dissolution in relation to Iraq’s international neighbors.
In the third stage of analysis, this study examines three solutions to developing a
stable geopolitical structure for Iraq through examination of three different political
models:
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1. Iraq governed by a strong central government;
2. Development of a federal model with three key regions defined along ethnolinguistic-religious lines;
3. Iraq decentralized into multiple regional governments (more than three).
This section examines these three different models and attempts to proffer a political
structure based on the current geopolitical climate that could serve to strengthen the state
of Iraq. I argue that option two could have the highest probability of enduring success,
but within specific constraints that must be explained in detail.
First, within the literature and commentary, there exists the belief that Iraq should
be partitioned into three separate geopolitical states. The international community is
unlikely to support dissolution of Iraq’s current international borders to accommodate the
creation of three separate states. As seen from the impacts of the Arab Spring, drastic
change has not brought stability to the Middle East. Dissolution of Iraq’s borders could
create a geopolitical disaster impacting not only the Middle East but also the world
economy. For option two to be successful, I argue that Iraq must maintain its current
international borders, thereby maintaining geopolitical stability within the region.
Second, Iraq must develop a model of federalism that is symbolic of its diverse
population’s ethnic, cultural, religious, and political outlooks. While most Middle East
inhabitants distrust anything of Western origin, the Swiss federal model, with certain
cultural adjustments, could provide a framework that would stabilize the internal political
environment of Iraq. Before any model can be implemented, it is necessary for all or a
vast majority of the ethno-linguistic-religious groups to agree to participate in the
development of the new federal model. In cases where groups choose not to participate,
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every effort needs to be taken to ensure those groups’ individual rights are protected
within the federal model. As seen throughout the literature, federal models are either
symmetrical or asymmetrical. According to Weller and Nobbs (2010, 6), “asymmetrical
federal designs are sometimes adopted as a way of terminating secessionist disputes.”
Asymmetrical autonomous arrangements may need to be a component of the Iraq federal
model in order to ensure that secession by different ethno-linguistic-religious groups is
prevented from destabilizing the country and the region.
Finally, as the Islamic religion plays a defining role in the Middle East,
incorporation of Islamic principles, while also incorporating religious freedom through
autonomous arrangements within the Iraq federal model, is necessary to gain the
acceptance of the majority of Iraq’s population. This action would create a template for a
federal state based on Middle East culture and religious beliefs, while also incorporating
the Western ideology of federalism. Where early attempts by the British, French and,
later, the United States and the U.S.S.R. failed to effect positive change in the Middle
East, an Iraq federal model designed and implemented by Iraqis and rooted in Islam
could serve as a future template for other Middle East countries to develop their own
federal systems. The challenge that exists in an Islamic-based federal model is how to
contain Islamic extremism effectively and to prevent its adherents from destroying
positive improvements in Iraq’s political system. The methodology used in this research
aims to identify, at the very least, the positive and negative value of each model of
government proposed as a solution to Iraq’s geopolitical problems. The results should
provide a framework for future scholars to build upon when developing solutions for the
future stability of the state of Iraq.
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Analysis
Understanding the Human Components of Iraq
Iraq is a country consisting of multiple ethno-linguistic-religious groups residing
within borders artificially created by Western powers at the conclusion of WWI. By
combining the Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul (Figure 6), the Western
Powers created a state that would encapsulate one of the most diverse populations in the
Middle East. The human component of Iraq is challenging to understand, due to the
diversity of the population. A significant portion of the population is ethnically
homogeneous, primarily Arab or Kurd, but is heterogeneous based along religious and
linguistic lines (e.g., Sunni vs. Shia, Arabic vs. Kurdish) (see Figure 1). According to the
CIA (2014):
1. Arabs make up 75-80 percent of the population, Kurds 15-20 percent, with a
few minority groups, including Turkomen and Assyrians, who make up less
than 5 percent of the population;
2. Arabic and Kurdish are the two official languages spoken in Iraq, but other
dialects exist in limited areas;
3. Over 99 percent of the population is Muslim. Of these, 60-65 percent adheres
to the Shi’a faith of Islam, while 32-37 percent adheres to the Sunni faith.
The remaining one percent of the population is made up of Christian, Hindu,
Buddhist, Jewish, and other religions.
The diverse population in Iraq has served as a constant destabilizing force for the
state, leading to multiple ethnic and sectarian conflicts from its inception to the present
day. To better understand the difficulties and centrifugal forces experienced by the
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numerous conflicts between the two Muslim sects, creating a rift that exists to the present
day. According to Merritt (2007, 41):
The long-standing hatred and distrust of Shi’a is a component in the very
identity of the Sunni Arab. The continual conflict since the original split of
Islam in 632 CE likely plays an important role in understanding the
situation in Iraq.
This section discusses the historical significance of the Sunni-led governments in Iraq
that repressed the multiple ethno-linguistic-religious groups of the state. It also identifies
the problems that resulted from the de-Ba’thification of Iraqi society, which embroiled
the country in sectarian conflict that is still occurring today.
From the creation of the mandate in the 1920s until the fall of the Saddam Husayn
regime in 2003, the Sunni Arabs dominated Iraqi politics and controlled the state. The
Sunni Arabs led more secular-oriented governments as opposed to a government rooted
in Islam. To maintain control of the multiple ethno-linguistic-religious groups, the
monarchy, and later the Sunni Arab military officers and politicians, utilized force to
keep tribal and sectarian opposition from destabilizing the state. During the period of
Sunni Arab dominance, both the Kurds and the Shi’a Arabs were marginalized both
politically and culturally. The Sunni Arabs attempted to unite the state under the banner
of Arab Nationalism, but this further increased the divide between the Kurds, whose
ultimate goal was autonomy and statehood, and the Shi’a, who preferred a less secular
state devoid of foreign involvement (Marr 2012).
The coup of July 17, 1968, brought the Ba’th Party to full power in Iraq. The
Ba’ath party “was dedicated to the ideal of establishing an Iraqi nation” (Merritt 2007,
42; Bengio and Ben-Dor 1999). According to Baram (1997, 1):
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As soon as it came to power in Iraq in July 1968, the Ba’th Party
announced in its Communique No. 1 its rejection of "tribalism" in no
uncertain terms. "We are against religious sectarianism (al-td'ifiyya),
racism, and tribalism (al-qabaliyya)," it declared, defining all these ills as
"the remnants of colonialism."
Despite this hard-lined rhetoric, as Saddam Husayn’s influence and power increased in
the Ba’th party during the 1970s, he utilized tribal lineages and symbolism to enhance the
power of certain Sunni Arab clans, which further minimized the Shi’a and Kurdish
populations’ influence (Merritt 2007). The Ba’th party invested in a security apparatus
that prevented internal divisions in the party, and the party leadership began its process of
Ba’thization. The Ba’thization program banned non-Ba’thists from civil service, highlevel education positions, and military leadership, and instituted a school curriculum
indoctrinating Iraqis with the party ideals (Abdullah 2011). According to Abdullah (2011,
132):
These policies had a profound social impact. In place of tribe, or religious
community, and with independent civil institutions not allowed to emerge,
the individual came to be linked directly to an all-controlling state.
These actions further cemented Sunni Arab control over the state, creating a lopsided
governmental power structure.
The central government, now under the control of the Ba’th Party, had to deal
with multiple uprisings during the 1970s from both the Kurds and the Shi’a Arabs. The
Shi’a revolts were dealt with through judicial trials and, in some cases, military action
that killed and wounded a large number of Shi’a civilians. The Kurds went to full war
with the regime with military support from Iran. After reaching an agreement with Iran to
remove support for the Kurdish fighters, the Iraqi government was able to defeat the
Kurdish resistance. An autonomy agreement was reached with the Kurdistan region but,
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to ensure that future Kurdish rebellions would not occur, the Iraqi state encouraged Arab
settlement of Kurdish cities and supported forced removal of Kurds from these areas as
well as rural areas bordering Turkey and Iran (Abdullah 2011; Marr 2012).
When Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr resigned as President in 1979, he appointed Saddam
Husayn in his place. Saddam immediately “conducted an extensive purge of the
government and party” (Abdullah 2011, 136). Saddam Husayn created the façade of a
democratically elected government by holding elections for the National Assembly. In
reality, “the National Assembly was a powerless body [that] basically rubber-stamped all
the president’s decisions” (Abdullah 2011, 136). Additionally, the only citizens
authorized to run for political office had to be approved by an election commission,
which ensured that only Ba’th party loyalists could run (Marr 2012). Over the course of
the next 24 years, Saddam Husayn used “his prejudice against Shi’a and Kurds to widen
the already enormous rift between the ethnic groups” (Merritt 2007, 44). He crushed
Kurdish and Shi’a opposition movements with overwhelming military force and chemical
weapons. It would not be until the 2003 invasion of Iraq that the Ba’th and Sunni Arabs
would be removed from control over the country.
The de-Ba’thification of Iraq proved to be one of the most costly mistakes made
by the United States immediately following its military invasion. The first Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) order “disestablished the Ba’th Party and aimed to eliminate
the party structures to ‘ensure that representative government in Iraq is not threatened by
Ba’thist elements returning to power’” (Marr 2012, 267). While de-Ba’thification was
popular with the Kurds and the Shi’a, the act of de-Ba’thification, followed by
dissolution of the Iraqi Army, created a drastic instability in the occupied state due to the
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destruction of Iraq’s institutional structure. The Sunni Arab population of the country was
soon embroiled in an insurgency fueled by numerous grievances. According to Marr
(2012, 274-275):
One was obvious, shock and rejection of foreign occupation and rule,
accompanied by outrage at de-Ba’thification and the displacement of
Sunni Arab leaders by exiles and opposition elements. Sunnis were also
dismayed at the increasing ethnic and sectarian basis of rule, which
seemed to be undermining state unity… A second source of the
insurgency drew on a more locally rooted nationalism, often intermixed
with tribally based codes of honor… A third source of opposition came
from foreign elements, most notably those loosely associated with alQa’ida.
Over the course of the insurgency, Sunni Arabs were discouraged from participating in
the development of a new Iraqi government by religious clerics, which opened the door
for Kurdish and Shi’a politicians to shape the 2005 Constitution in a way that benefited
their ethno-linguistic-religious groups while marginalizing the Sunnis. This would lead to
an horrific period of sectarian conflict pitting Sunni against Shi’a and Arab against Kurd.
Sectarian conflict and the Sunni insurgency began to diminish in 2007. This was
due in large part to the Sunni Arabs turning against al-Qa’ida and the insurgency. “While
many Sunni leaders have abandoned the resistance and turned against the more extremist
groups (like al-Qa’ida), they still complain of being excluded from important state
institutions” (Abdullah 2011, 174). Furthermore, oppression of the Sunni population is
still ongoing by the Shi’a-led government in Baghdad. Van Buren (2014, 1) stated:
The Iraqi army, along with paramilitary police from the Interior Ministry,
had engaged in a multi-year campaign of beating, imprisoning, and
arresting Sunnis, to the point where many felt that Baghdad was
occupying, not governing.
It can be argued that the rapid ISIS advance through western Iraq through primarily Sunni
areas was a result of the maltreatment of the Sunni population. Many journalists are
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currently positing that the Sunni Arabs in Iraq may be waiting to see if their situation
improves before picking sides. It is important to note that not all Sunnis share this view.
With recent news reports focused on the atrocities carried out by ISIS, it will be
interesting to see how the Sunni population eventually reacts to ISIS occupation.
Shi’a Arabs
The Shi’a population comprises approximately 60-65 percent of the total
population in Iraq and inhabits the southeastern half of the state. Despite being from the
same sect of Islam as the Persian population of Iran to the east, ethnically the Shi’a
population of Iraq is predominantly Arab. The Sunni-Shi’a divide within the sect of Islam
was discussed earlier, and the fact that Shi’a Arabs were marginalized politically during
Sunni Arab control of Iraq has been noted. This section briefly touches on historical
events related to the Shi’a marginalization in Iraqi government and politics under the
Sunni-led governments. It highlights the events that led to the rise of Shi’a dominance
within the Iraqi government post-2003 invasion and the issues their role reversal with the
Sunni Arabs created.
Early in the creation of the Iraq mandate there was a shared vision among the
Sunni and the Shi’a based on opposition to foreign control; however, the Sunnis also
“feared that Shi’i leadership of government [in Iraq] would open the door to sectarianism
and even to theocratic rule” (Marr 2012, 31). Initially, conflict between the Sunni and
Shi’a Arabs in Iraq grew out of tribal conflict. This conflict originated mostly in Shi’a
areas in response to the increased power and influence of the central government during
the transition from a tribal society to a more developed state. “A striking manifestation of
this transition was the erosion of the power and authority of the shaikh within the tribe as
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the new state extended its reach into the countryside” (Marr 2012, 41). As tribal
rebellions increased, the amount of force used to defeat the uprisings increased and the
rebellions were dealt with ruthlessly. The excessive use of force by the Sunni-led
government established a tentative “peace” in the southern tribal region.
During the 1950s and 1960s, multiple Shi’a revivals took place. “The intense
secularism of the [Iraq] regime and its support for the leftist policies soon provoked a
reaction from conservative Shi’a elements and a religious revival among the Shi’a youth”
(Marr 2012, 103). An important Shi’a Islamic group, the Da’wa, emerged under the
leadership of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. “The Da’wa was interested in reshaping Islam
and its teachings to meet the needs of the modern world and in organizing to protect and
spread these ideas” (Marr 2012, 103). The Da’wa would later become a political party
“aimed at the eventual establishment of an Islamic state,” and as both Sunni domination
and Shi’a discrimination increased, so did the development of a stronger Shi’a identity.
(Marr 2012, 103-104).
Under Saddam Husayn, discrimination against and distrust of the Shi’a continued
to increase, as did the rift between the Sunni and the Shi’a Arabs. Interestingly, the fear
of the Sunni elite during the mandate period would come to fruition after the US-led
invasion and overthrow of the Saddam regime in 2003. The continuous mistreatment of
Shi’a Arabs by the Sunni Arabs throughout the 20th century would lead to a bloody
sectarian conflict as the religiously oriented Shi’a parties became the dominant force in
post-invasion Iraqi politics.
Once the 2003 invasion of Iraq was complete, the United States regarded the fall
of Saddam Husayn as an opportunity to build a stable democracy in Iraq, which might
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facilitate democratic movements in the rest of the Middle East region (Merritt 2007; Nasr
2006). This, however, was not a shared view of the Iraqis. As Nasr (2006, 58) stated:
Rather than viewing the fall of Saddam as an occasion to create a liberal
democracy, therefore, many Iraqis viewed it as an opportunity to redress
injustices in the distribution of power among the country's major
communities. By liberating and empowering Iraq's Shiite majority, the
Bush administration helped launch a broad Shiite revival that [would]
upset the sectarian balance in Iraq and the Middle East for years to come.
The Sunni Arabs were unwilling to cooperate with the creation of a new Iraqi
government as long as the state was occupied by foreign forces and the campaign of deBa’thification was aimed at all Sunni Arab leaders. This allowed the exiled Shi’a
opposition leaders to enhance their position in the interim Iraqi government by placing
Shi’a Arabs in key positions. De-Ba’thification and the overthrow of Saddam Husayn
essentially shifted power from the Sunni to the Shi’a rather than promote “liberation of
the Iraqi people as a nation” (Merritt 2007, 50). As sectarian violence and insurgency
from the Sunni Arabs increased in response to US occupation and de-Ba’thification, the
Shi’a also faced insurgency from their own population. The Sadrists, led by Muqtada alSadr, became a divisive force among the Shi’a Islamist movement, as well as within the
coalition and the IGC. According to Marr (2012, 277):
They [the Sadrists] were adamantly opposed to US occupation. They were
insiders who had endured Iraq under Saddam and who resented the ‘exile’
opposition. And they had not been included in the emerging government
structure…The Sadrists also had a very different constituency – the young
and the poor in Sadr City and other towns of the south.
Sadr created the Mahdi Army, which engaged U.S. forces, rival Shi’a groups, and took
control of various locations in multiple cities. This led to dissent for Sadr in both the
Shi’a community and from Shi’a Islamist parties. Eventually, Sadr would be forced to
stand down and negotiate a cease fire, but his insurgency coupled with the Sunni
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insurgency and terrorist attacks from al-Qa’ida greatly affected the establishment of the
new Iraqi government.
In 2005, the Shi’a swept a large portion of the seats in the first parliamentary
election. The results of the election were clear, and they indicated that fragmentation
existed along ethnic and sectarian lines. The Shi’a parties took over 51 percent of the
seats during the election, followed by the Kurds who took 27 percent. The remaining
seats were taken by non-sectarian parties, the Sunni, and minority interest groups.
According to Marr (2012, 289):
The biggest losers [in the 2005 elections] were the Sunni Arabs. Sunni
groups won only six parliamentary seats (2 percent) although a few Arabs
Sunnis ran on other party labels. This left Sunnis with little voice in the
constitutional process.
Despite efforts by the U.S. to relax the de-Ba’thification process and include the Sunnis
in the constitutional process, both Shi’a and Kurds were able to shape the Constitution in
their favor, minimizing the strength of the Sunni Arabs. The Shi’a, still fearful of
Ba’thism, ensured that de-Ba’thification would continue, further alienating the Sunni
Arabs. Fearful of further exclusion from the political process, the Sunnis began to align
themselves along sectarian lines. This prompted the Shi’a, who feared Sunni extremist
violence, to do the same. Sectarian violence erupted in Baghdad from 2006-2007, and
Sunni and Shi’a militias conducted numerous killings and assassinations against each
other. As sectarian violence decreased in 2007, the Shi’a Arabs essentially cemented their
control over the Iraqi government. This resulted in further discrimination against the
Sunni Arab population, which continues to this day.
Despite U.S. attempts at creating a democratic state inclusive of all ethnolinguistic-religious groups, the current state of Iraq is best characterized as a fragile state
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with increasing sectarian rifts. As the U.S. has become more critical of Iraq’s government, Iraq has looked to Iran for support. “Since 2003, Sunni leaders in Egypt, Jordan,
and Saudi Arabia have repeatedly blamed Iran for the chaos in Iraq and warned that Iran
would wield considerable influence in the region if Iraqi Shiites came to hold the reins of
power in Baghdad” (Nasr 2006, 60). Since coming to power, the Shi’a-led government in
Iraq has developed positive diplomatic relations with the Iranian government.This is
likely a result of many of the exiled Shi’a politicians living in Iran prior to returning to
Iraq after the fall of Saddam Husayn.
During the development of the new Iraqi government, Iran has been linked to
various Shi’a political movements as well as to support for various Shi’a-based militias
during the insurgency. Iran has a strategic interest in a Shi’a-dominated government in
Iraq. For a number of years, Iran has been surrounded by hostile Sunni Arab-dominated
states. A Shi’a-dominated government in Iraq creates a buffer between these hostile
regimes, and increases Iran’s regional influence as well as access to Iraq’s oil reserves.
Iran’s impact on Iraqi politics continues today, and this was validated by Iran’s
immediate response to Iraq’s plea for assistance in dealing with the ISIS advance.
Continuing Iran-Iraq relations pose a difficult conundrum for the U.S. With Iran
advancing its influence over Iraq, the possibility of an increased sectarian rift becomes
more likely.
The Kurds
According to O’Leary (2002, 17), “The Kurds, an Iranian ethno-linguistic group,
inhabit the mostly mountainous area [in the Middle East] where the borders of Turkey,
Iran, Iraq, and Syria converge.” After WWI, the Kurds were promised their own nation-
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state. This section outlines the historic plight of the Kurds in Iraq and discusses their role
in the creation of the current Iraqi government.
Kurdish history in Iraq has been framed by the Kurds’ numerous attempts to
attain autonomy from the Iraqi government through peaceful negotiations and all-out war.
Romano (2010, 1345) stated:
As leaders in Baghdad (whether under the monarchy before 1958 or the
republican regimes that followed) sought to legitimize their rule, forge a
new state, and unite Shi‘is and Sunnis via a discourse of Arab nationalism,
the Kurds’ place in Iraq remained ever uncertain.
Numerous Kurdish uprisings against the Iraqi government occurred from the 1920s
through the 1990s and led to heavy oppression by the different Iraqi regimes. “Mustafa
Barzani established the KDP [Kurdish Democratic Party] to include its militia, the
peshmerga, and conducted an unsuccessful revolt that lasted for decades against the Iraqi
government (Merritt 2007, 57). The goal of the Kurds during these uprisings was to
establish a Kurdish Autonomous Region. Multiple agreements were developed over the
years to pacify the Kurds but, on multiple occasions, the Iraqi government voided these
agreements for its own benefit. One such peace agreement was established on 11 March,
1970, according to Marr (2012, 152), and:
It provided for Kurdish autonomy (the first official use of the word), and it
guaranteed proportional representation of Kurds within a future legislative
body, the appointment of a Kurdish vice president at the national level, the
expenditure of an equitable amount of oil revenue in the autonomous
regions, and the recognition of both Kurdish and Arabic as official
languages in Kurdish territory.
The agreement failed to endure due to transgressions by both the Iraqi government and
the Kurds. Specifically, the Iraqi government began to displace numerous Kurds in the
cities of Kirkuk and Mosul and replace them with Arabs. The Kurds, in turn, chose not to

59

close their borders with Iran and sought aid from the U.S. The breakdown of the
agreement led to war between the Kurds and the Iraqi government resuming in 1974.
The war was eventually won by the Iraqi government, when a successful negotiation with
Iran to remove its military assistance to the Kurds gave the Iraqi government the
momentum to defeat the Kurdish rebellion.
After the Kurdish defeat in 1975, a new problem emerged within the Kurdish
population. “In 1975, a split occurred in the KDP when Jalal Talabani founded the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)” (Merritt 2007, 58). This split was a result of rifts
that developed within the KDP over a number of years. The creation of the PUK led
eventually to an ongoing conflict between the PUK and the KDP that sidelined advances
in Kurdish autonomy due to Kurdish infighting.
The next major obstacle faced by the Kurds was partly the result of their
involvement in the Iran-Iraq War and also partly due to an ethnic-cleansing campaign
established by Saddam Husayn (O’Leary 2002). During the Iran-Iraq War, the Kurds
provided military assistance to Iran, and at the conclusion of the war Saddam Husayn
turned his attention to the Kurds in an attempt to eliminate any resistance to his
government amongst the Kurdish community. According to O’Leary (2002, 18):
Its [the campaign’s] specific aim was to cleanse the region of saboteurs’—
who included all males between the ages of 15 and 70. Mass executions
were carried out in the targeted villages and surrounding areas.
In addition to mass executions, Saddam Husayn established economic blockades in the
Kurdish region and resorted to chemical weapon attacks to destroy the Kurdish
communities. One of the largest cleansings occurred when Saddam Husayn launched
“campaigns against the Iraqi Kurds in 1988, killing an estimated 50,000 to 200,000”

60

(Logan 2009: 166). The campaign effectively decimated the Kurdish community by
destroying over 1,200 Kurdish villages.
In 1991, the Kurds initiated an uprising against Saddam Husayn after U.S.
broadcasts encouraged the Iraqi Shi’a and Kurdish populations to rise up and overthrow
the Saddam Husayn regime following the invasion of Kuwait. U.S. support did not
materialize for the rebellions and the Iraqi Republican Guard quickly crushed the
uprising. With a large refugee crisis looming, a no-fly zone and safe haven were created
under U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 in northern Iraq. Under the protection of a
no-fly zone, the Kurdish population of Iraq began operating under an autonomous
regional government. The Kurdish government established in 1992 had left the region
unstable and underdeveloped due to the civil conflict between competing Kurdish
political parties. “This situation changed dramatically after the US-led invasion of 2003,
which forced the KDP and PUK, with its Peshmerga fighters, to work together (van
Wilgenburg 2012: 49).
Just like the Shi’a, the Kurds benefited from the Sunni boycott of the 2005
elections and the lack of Sunni representation on the constitutional committee. Marr
(2012, 293) noted:
They [the Kurds] insisted on a distribution of power between the central
government and regions, which gave the latter priority. The Kurds
worked to weaken the authority of the central government on issues such
as taxation, health, and education. In essence, the Kurds wanted a
virtually independent state in the north in a voluntary union with Iraq – a
confederation – with a right to secede. Even though they did not get this,
they did manage to get a weak central government and a highly
decentralized polity.
The Kurds also utilized their peshmerga forces to stabilize their region. While the Sunni
and the Shi’a Arabs were engaged in sectarian civil war, the Kurds sealed their borders
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and were able to establish peace in their sphere of influence. This allowed for a
significant level of development within the Kurdish economy as well as in their political,
social, and cultural institutions (Marr 2012).
Since 2007, the KRG, “once an unrecognized local body, has become an
internationally legitimized entity in a quasi-state” (Natali 2007, 1111). As the U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq began to take shape in 2010-2011, the prosperity of the Kurdish
Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq was evident. “Given the KRG region’s progressive
investment law, free market practices and excellent security situation relative to the rest
of Iraq, foreign direct investment in the region exploded” (Gunter 2011, 104). With the
KRG gaining more power and stability “the deteriorating relationship between the
semiautonomous Kurdish minority in the north and the central government in Baghdad is
perhaps [one of] the most incendiary of Iraq’s potential crisis” (van Wilgenburg 2012,
47).
Iraq’s Economic Development
Sectarian conflict took a toll on Iraq’s economic development between 2005 and
2007. The lack of security during this time resulted in very little foreign direct investment
in the state’s economy. As violence began to subside, economic repair materialized,
especially in the oil industry. With oil remaining Iraq’s main resource and export,
rebuilding and development of Iraq’s oil industry became a priority. It took time but, by
the end of 2010, foreign oil companies had signed contracts and had begun working to
rebuild Iraq’s oil infrastructure in order to boost production (Marr 2012). Currently, Iraq's
oil industry “provides more than 90% of government revenue and 80% of foreign
exchange earnings” (CIA 2014, 1). Iraq benefited from the rise in global oil prices, but
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transferring those benefits to raising the standard of living for the local populace has
eluded the Iraqi government. Additionally, the dispute between the central government
and the KRG regarding oil contracts initiated by the KRG needs to be resolved. Many of
these contracts involve boundaries in disputed administrative territories, specifically
Kirkuk (Marr 2012; CIA 2014). This dispute is a constitutional issue that needs to be
addressed to ensure future benefit from the oil contracts. Finally, extensive repair to the
oil and export infrastructure still needs to be completed in order for Iraq to benefit fully
from its vast oil reserves. Once this work is completed, the state could maximize
production and increase revenues. A caveat to this process, however, is the impact a
dramatic decline in oil prices might have on the future of the Iraq economy.
The Iraqi government also has taken steps to further the state’s participation in the
global economy. With the help of the United Nations, programs were created to assist in
economic reform and investment in energy and agriculture. Tourism improved due to an
increase in security in many parts of the country, and foreign direct investment by Iraq’s
neighbors increased as well. Turkey became a major investor in the Kurdish region, and
reached an agreement with the Iraqi government to expand the Ceyhan oil pipeline (Marr
2012). In 2009, Iran became Iraq’s primary trading partner; however, “the Iranian
government subsidized its exports and levied import taxes on inbound goods, making it
difficult for Iraqis to compete” (Marr 2012, 362). Vast amounts of subsidized agriculture
products have been shipped into Iraq from Iran, flooding the local Iraqi markets. This has
made it more economical for the Iraqis to purchase imported agriculture products rather
than growing their own. For example, “in 2008, Iraq imported 74 percent of its wheat
from abroad” (Marr 2012, 365). For Iraq to benefit from foreign trading, significant
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investment into the industry and agricultural sectors is necessary to deliver goods at a
more competitive price for Iraqi citizens. This could be difficult because it is currently
cheaper to use oil revenues to import goods and services as opposed to investing in the
rebuilding of the agricultural and industrial sectors.
As Marr (2012, 363) noted, “The greatest need in Iraq’s economy was for
development of the country’s human resources.” Iraq is attempting to rebuild its labor
force through better educational programs for its population and investment in social
overhead capital; however, this takes significant time and does not help immediately the
increasing unemployed population. Further affecting this problem was the “brain drain”
that occurred from 2003 to 2007, which was a result of “the huge outpouring of doctors,
professors, lawyers, engineers, scientists, writers, artists, and bureaucrats” (Marr 2012,
370). Iraq is trying to right this deficiency through scholarship programs, but it needs to
develop incentives and opportunities for its educated population to contribute to the Iraqi
state as opposed to seeking employment elsewhere.
There have been notable improvements to the Iraqi economy, since the security
situation has improved in the state; however, that progress remains uncertain due to the
current conflict with ISIS. If the ISIS conflict can be contained and stability returned to
Iraq, an economic development strategy needs to be created to ensure future improvements continue. “Rampant corruption, outdated infrastructure, insufficient essential
services, skilled labor shortages, and antiquated commercial laws stifle investment and
continue to constrain growth of private, nonoil sectors” (CIA 2014, 1). As oil continues
to be the primary source of income for the Iraqi economy, a strategy that funnels that
capital into the development of other areas of the economy is crucial. This is a budgetary
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action that needs to be implemented by the central and provincial governments. As Al-Ali
(2012, 182) stated:
One way to achieve this is by employing the government budget as a
medium to spread the development, which has taken place in the oil sector
across other sectors of the economy. As such, the government budget is
seen to play a dual role: firstly, as a means by which development in the
oil sector are directed to induce and facilitate the development of other
sectors in the economy, and secondly, as an instrument for economic
stabilization and development polices.
Pumping oil revenues into different economic sectors and into social overhead capital
could decrease the state’s reliance on the volatile oil sector. This strategy provides an
opportunity for future stability within the Iraqi state and its economy, and invests in
human capital, thus strengthening other areas of the state.
Centripetal vs. Centrifugal Forces
The analysis of the ethno-linguistic-religious groups and the Iraqi economy
highlights a number of centrifugal forces that are barriers to progress within the state of
Iraq. This section offers additional analysis on these centrifugal forces and identifies
centripetal forces that exist that could counteract the divisive forces. While the
significance of centripetal forces may seem trivial in comparison to the centrifugal forces
in the state, the magnitude of problems that could occur due to state dissolution as a result
of centrifugal forces warrants an examination of the positive aspects of the state. By
developing and nurturing Iraq’s centripetal forces, it may be possible to avoid state
dissolution.
Sunni-Shi’a Divide
The multiple ethno-linguistic-religious groups that exist in Iraq are not just a
centrifugal force. As seen in India and Switzerland, with the proper establishment of a
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federal system of government, multi-ethnic populations can exist within a stable state.
The centrifugal force associated with Iraq’s ethno-linguistic-religious groups is the
history of marginalization and suppression of the Shi’a and Kurds under the Sunnidominated regimes, followed by suppression of the Sunni by the current Iraqi state. The
Sunni-Shi’a split that occurred in 632 C.E. may be the starting point for sectarian
differences between the two religious groups, but the Sunni-Shi’a divide that has
occurred in Iraq is a result of the governmental policies that occurred under the Sunnidominated governments. This divide has created a deep-rooted hatred between the two
religious groups and has been exploited by both as well.
Under Sunni controlled governments, the Shi’a have suffered years of
marginalization in Iraqi society and have been the target of numerous security and
military actions to keep the Sunni Arabs in control of the state. This role was reversed
after de-Ba’thification removed almost all Sunni Arabs during the establishment of the
new Iraqi government. Instead of fostering a path to reconciliation, the Shi’a politicians,
fearful of a return of Sunni-Arab dominance, sought to right the injustices that
marginalized their population for so many years. This led to one of the worst sectarian
conflicts the country and region had ever endured. Now, with ISIS advancing from the
Sunni-populated areas of western Iraq, the Shi’a Arab politicians might be rethinking
their policies of retribution and discrimination against the Sunni Arab population. The
Shi’a Arabs need the participation of Sunni Arabs to expel ISIS effectively from the
western portion of the state. The ISIS conflict could serve as a unifying force if the Sunni
are approached properly by the Shi’a-dominated government; conversely, this conflict
could be the divisive force that tears the state apart. Regardless of what happens, the
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Sunni-Shia divide is one of the most contentious centrifugal forces that exist in the state.
For Iraq to maintain its current geopolitical borders, this Sunni-Shi’a divide must be
addressed.
The best way to address this divide is by drawing on past feelings of Iraqi
nationalism as a centripetal force. While most scholars agree that, in recent years, Iraqi
nationalism has been replaced with sectarian loyalties, it has been noted that “nearly 70
percent of those polled still prefer to identify themselves as Iraqi citizens rather than
through ethnic, religious, or regional affiliations” (Abdullah 2011, 173). As Al-Hashimi
(2014, 1) noted in his USA Today column, “an Iraqi consciousness, an Iraqi identity, has
become weaker and weaker… [and] if Iraq can be saved, it will only be if they [sic] fight
to save Iraq’s national identity.” Fostering this feeling of national identity is important in
dealing with the ISIS threat and the future direction of the state. This requires a
significant level of reconciliation between the Sunni and the Shi’a Arabs and possibly a
nationalism campaign. The ISIS threat provides a great opportunity for the Iraqi
government to strengthen a national identity, especially with the atrocities that are being
executed by ISIS against all ethno-linguistic-religious groups, including the Sunni Arabs.
Kurdish Independence
The Kurdish desire for an independent nation-state still threatens to divide Iraq.
“Today, if they felt that geopolitical conditions would allow it, most Iraqi Kurds would
opt for complete independence” (Romano 2010, 1347). When the Kurds were promised
their own nation-state, a promise withdrawn at the end of WWI, this set in motion the
constant political and military struggles of the Kurdish people in Iraq and across the
Middle East. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, coupled with the current instability as a
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result of the ISIS advance, only compounded the desire of the Kurds to secede from the
current Iraqi state. The viability of a Kurdish state is analyzed later in this thesis but, of
the three ethno-linguistic-religious groups, the Kurds are the most likely to be successful
in establishing a stable independent state. If the Kurds were to break from Iraq, the
ramifications would be considerable for the remainder of the state. The territorial disputes
over Kurdish-populated cities such as Kirkuk and the vast oil reserves that exist in the
Arab-Kurd transition zones likely could develop into a military dispute between the new
Kurdistan and the remaining Arab-Iraq state. This could compound instability in the
region and could result in the involvement of both Turkey and Iran, who vehemently
object to the creation of a Kurdish state.
Desire for Kurdish independence could be countered by past political relations
between the Kurds and the Shi’a. The reconstitution of the coalition between the Shi’a
and Kurds that existed during the initial establishment of the new Iraqi government may
serve as a unifying centripetal force to keep the Kurdish population from seeking
secession from Iraq. Both the Kurds and the Shi’a were consistently marginalized under
the Sunni-dominated governments, from the mandate period to the fall of the Saddam
Husayn regime. In addition, the Kurds and the Shi’a were targets of Husayn’s brutal
attacks and ethnic-cleansing campaigns. Upon the fall of the Husayn regime, the Kurds
and the Shi’a worked together to establish the current Iraqi government using this
common history as a basis for their political agendas. Their coalition was instrumental in
creating the Constitution and a federal state. More importantly, the autonomy arrangement developed for the Kurds was instrumental in keeping them from seeking full
secession from Iraq. Even though each group had its own political agendas, the
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partnership between the two groups effectively promoted significant strides in the
democratic evolution of the Iraqi state.
By drawing on these past events and common geopolitical plights, the current
central government could resolve the Kurdish disputes over Kirkuk and oil development
rights to decrease Kurdish grievances with the state. This requires a significant amount of
political maneuvering, amendments to the current Constitution, and possibly a new
federal structure for the state. But Iraq would be a more secure and stable state with the
Kurdish region remaining a part of the country.
Oil as a Centripetal and Centrifugal Force
Iraq’s oil reserves have the ability to be both a centripetal and centrifugal force for
the state. Iraq's oil industry “provides more than 90% of government revenue and 80% of
foreign exchange earnings” (CIA 2014, 1). The Iraqi government’s inability to translate
its oil wealth into significant benefits for the entire population remains one of the greatest
issues for the state. Typically, oil wealth remains in the hands of the political elite in
many oil-rich countries, and Iraq is no exception. Barnett et al. (2003, 26) noted:
There is little social or economic development beyond the elite. Thus, oil
and other resource-dependent economies are more prone to violent
internal conflict than are diversified economies.
Furthermore, Henry (2003, 61) has identified that “oil wealth ironically becomes a barrier
to good governance and development even as it provides the material wealth capable of
funding development projects.” A perfect example of a post-colonial country that has
failed to utilize successfully its oil wealth is Nigeria, which is Africa’s primary oil
producer. Nigeria’s oil revenue has led to social polarization and lack of diversification of
the country’s economy. Additionally, oil has fueled inter-regional conflict and
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complicated the country’s federal development. It would be in the best interests of the
Iraqi government to be mindful of its own recent failures as well as the failures of other
countries to utilize oil wealth as an economic diversifier.
Iraq, under the current federal structure, has the opportunity to break the mold of
Middle Eastern regimes and utilize its oil revenues as a centripetal force to invest in
social overhead capital as well as development projects that could diversify the economy.
It is also important that oil revenues benefit the entire state and not be strictly invested in
the oil-rich regions. Failure to do so could result in regional conflicts between the Kurds,
Sunni, and Shi’a. Finally, even though Iraq has significant oil reserves, oil is a finite
resource and cannot sustain the country over the long-term. Investment of oil revenue to
stimulate economic diversification is crucial to the future of Iraq’s stability.
Islamic Fundamentalism
A growing concern for the future stability of Iraq is the advance of ISIS. An
Islamic fundamentalist group, ISIS has been seizing and occupying territory in the state
of Iraq since June, 2014, and is trying to establish an Islamic caliphate across Iraq and
Syria. ISIS poses a significant risk to the stability of Iraq, and the lack of resistance from
the Sunni Arab population should be a deep cause for concern for the Iraqi government.
Islamic fundamentalism is not new to Iraq or the Middle East. Contemporary Islamic
fundamentalism, also known as Islamism, began in the late 1960s-early 1970s when “the
Islamic states of the Middle East- and beyond- experienced an outgrowth of popular
demands to restore Islam to a central role in political and social life” (Cleveland 2000,
426). More recently, Islamic fundamentalist groups have used the instability created by
the Arab Spring to infiltrate transitional governments in the Middle East and North
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Africa. This resulted from a lack of experience by the political youth “in managing the
post-Arab Spring political situation, and as such they were supplanted quickly by the
regimented and religiously-motivated Islamist groups” (Chtatou 2014, 1).
The danger of fundamentalist movements lies in their recruitment strategy and
agenda. They recruit from the oppressed populations of the Middle East, and they blame
secular governments and Western infringement on regional politics as the reason for
hardship and poverty in the region (Munson 2003). Islamic Fundamentalists argue that a
return to fundamentalist Islam will solve all the problems of their followers. As Munson
(2003: 43) explained:
For Islamists like Khomeini, the idea of a “return to Islam” is linked to
the goal of overcoming foreign domination. The underlying logic of
the Islamist argument is familiar: The believers are suffering because
they have deviated from the laws of God. To end their suffering, they
have to conform to God’s laws. God has allowed the infidels to
dominate the believers because they have deviated from His laws.
Once they conform, He will grant them victory. Such reasoning is
often meshed with more subtle themes, notably that of cultural
authenticity. The return to Islam becomes a means of regaining one’s
true cultural identity – as opposed to mimicry of the dominant West.
The danger that Islamic fundamentalism and ISIS pose to Iraq is significant. ISIS
has already forced multiple ethno-linguistic-religious groups to convert to its branch of
Islam. Those who do not convert are killed through mass executions. Women are being
forced to marry ISIS militants, and children are being forced to take lessons in radical
Islamic theology. The anti-Western sentiment is likely appealing to some of Iraq’s Sunni
Arab population; however, “many of the Sunni groups, especially those led by former
Baathists, are largely secular in nature, seeing their Sunni ties as broadly cultural rather
than strictly religious (Van Buren 2014, 1).
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If ISIS’ extreme tactics are not condoned by all Sunni Arabs, then Iraq’s best
solution to resolve this incursion is to promote a united national front to combat the
fundamentalist organization. This can only be accomplished through cooperation from all
ethno-linguistic-religious groups and an end to sectarian conflict within the state. Without
the support of the Sunni Arab population, Iraq could lose most of the western half of the
country. This could open the door for more Islamic fundamentalist organizations to
infiltrate Shi’a and Kurdish areas, further destabilizing the state to the point of complete
fracture.
Territorial Stability and the Limitations of the Three-State Solution
There has been significant debate regarding the current geopolitical structure of
Iraq since the U.S. invasion in 2003. As Iraq appeared to be destined for state failure
from 2005-2006, a three-state partition solution dominated world news as the best
approach to accommodate the multiple ethno-linguistic-religious groups that exist in the
state. Solutions varied from a weak federal model with three ethnic provinces, a
confederation of provinces based along ethnic lines, and the creation of three new microstates. With the advancement of ISIS over the past year, there has been increased interest
in establishing a three-state solution for the people of Iraq. This is easier said than done,
as partition of the country into three states has implications that could be the impetus for
further destabilization of the region.
If the world has learned anything from the Arab Spring, drastic change to the
geopolitical structure of Middle East and North African states has created significant
turmoil for those territories. Syria found itself in a civil war as well as occupation by the
terrorist group ISIS, Egypt has imprisoned its democratically elected president and is
currently governed under military rule, and Libya is quickly approaching state failure.
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Thus, partitioning Iraq into three micro-states based along ethno-linguistic-religious lines
appears to be a promising solution to the country’s sectarian issues; however, the second
and third order effects of this partition could surely bring further instability to the Middle
East.
When analyzing the partition of Iraq into three micro-states, multiple factors must
be taken into consideration:
1. Do internal territorial disputes exist that could complicate the independence
process?
2. Do the territories of the suggested three-state model have viability as independent
states?
3. Would international or cross-border issues result from a three-state model?
Internal territorial disputes do exist in Iraq and would surely complicate the partition of
the country into three micro-states. Looking back at Figure 1, it is clear that partitioning
the state along ethnic lines would be difficult, especially in the regions with inter-mixed
populations. Whether rational thought utilizing history and ethnic population distribution
is used or arbitrary lines are placed on the map, it is likely that wherever the line is
drawn, forced and voluntary migrations of people are highly likely and borders would be
disputed. Furthermore, economic concerns related to border creation could likely be a
source of conflict as well, considering the oil fields in Iraq are concentrated in the north
and east of the country. The question then becomes: where do the borders get drawn?
Looking first to the north of the country, the Kurdish-populated areas extend
south along the border of Iran and Syria. Kirkuk and Mosul are highly populated by both
Sunni Arabs and Kurds. Separating these areas from either ethnic group could cause
significant problems due to the risk of splitting ethnic populations and the loss of
economic benefits provided by the oil industry.
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Of the two cities, the main territorial dispute would likely be over Kirkuk,
historically a Kurdish city with a mixed population that includes Turkomens and Arabs.
Under Saddam Husayn, the process of Arabization displaced Kurdish inhabitants and
encouraged the migration of Arab citizens to the city in an attempt to control local
politics (Marr 2012). Since the fall of the Husayn government, the Kurds have been
lobbying for control over Kirkuk based along ethnic and historical lines; however, a
referendum and census to decide the affiliation of the province have been repeatedly
delayed. At the heart of the dispute are the oil fields near Kirkuk that provide a
significant source of revenue for the state of Iraq. An independent Kurdistan would need
the oil fields to provide economic stability for the state. In addition, giving a new Kurdish
state control over Kirkuk could possibly create a forced migration of Arabs from the
region and take a significant resource away from the Sunni population.
Looking further south, there is a large transitional zone between Sunni and Shi’a
populations. Over the years Sunni and Shi’a tribes co-populated areas and, in some cases,
intermarried. This raises the question again of where do the lines get drawn? Does it
make sense to give the Sunni or the Shi’a the intermixed population areas, or should an
attempt be made to separate the area along tribal lines? This action could create enclaves
or pockets of each group within the other’s territory, and either solution poses risk to both
groups. Baghdad would most likely be the greatest point of contention between the Sunni
and the Shi’a population for historical, political, and economic reasons. Baghdad has
served as capital of the region as far back as the 8th century under the Abbasid Caliphate
and has significant historical value to both the Sunni and the Shi’a. Baghdad has large
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State Viability
The internal territorial disputes highlight economic dependence upon oil as a major
factor in the creation of three micro-states. If a state does not possess a strong economic
foundation, then its ability to survive independently becomes a serious challenge. Iraq’s
oil resources provide over 90% of government revenues. If any of the three proposed
micro-states are cut off from the oil industry, their ability to remain a viable state
diminishes significantly. In addition to economic factors, an examination of political and
security factors is also warranted to determine state viability.
Kurdistan
Of the three major ethno-linguistic-religious groups, the Kurds have the greatest
chance of success for establishing a functioning state. The Kurds had autonomous
arrangements in Iraq well before the U.S. invasion in 2003. Following the Gulf War, the
Kurdish region of Iraq was protected under a no-fly zone preventing the Husayn regime
from conducting attacks in the area. This allowed the Kurdish people to establish a
regional government with their own elected bodies and security forces. Under the 2005
Iraqi Constitution, the Kurds were able to maintain a significant degree of autonomy;
however, disputed territory and ownership of natural resources in the region remained an
unresolved issue. Despite these issues, the two dominant political parties in the Kurdish
region, the KDP and the PUK, were able to reach a unification agreement that allowed
the Kurdish government to focus on economic development as well as on building
political, social, cultural institutions (Marr 2012).
The Kurdish Regional Government’s (KRG) success in developing its security
forces, political institutions, and economic resources correlates to the high level of
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stability and security achieved by the Kurds. This security has attracted foreign direct
investment, which has further enhanced the region’s economic stability. The increased
stability, security, and the positive relations with the international community increase
the likelihood that the Kurds would be able to operate independently of the state of Iraq.
Three major concerns arise with the creation of a Kurdish state. First, the region would be
landlocked, forcing an independent Kurdish state to be dependent on its international
neighbors for product export. With relationships already shaky with Turkey and Iran, this
could pose a potential problem for an independent Kurdish state. Second, the Kurdish
state would be at great risk without the oil reserves in Kirkuk. Despite the objections of
the Iraqi government, the Kurds have been developing the oil fields in the region and
seeking foreign direct investment. Without the oil fields as a source of income, an
independent Kurdish state would have to develop a new source of revenue quickly to
maintain its viability as a functioning state. Third, the KRG’s international neighbors,
specifically Turkey and Iran, do not support an independent Kurdish state. This is
discussed in detail later in the analysis.
Sunni Iraq
Creation of a Sunni Iraq state would be the most difficult micro-state to establish.
The Sunni and the Shi’a Arabs share a great deal of territory, political history, and
resentment of each other. The development of the Sunni micro-state would depend
greatly on the ability of the Sunni and Shi’a to set aside sectarian tensions effectively,
demarcate borders, and reach agreements on resource allocation and distribution of
security forces. Failure to complete any one of these actions could lead to a civil war
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between the two groups, possibly leading to intervention from Iran on the side of the
Shi’a and Saudi Arabia on the side of the Sunni.
The de-Ba’thification of Iraq that took place under the CPA significantly
damaged the power of the Sunni Arabs. While a significant amount of military and
political experience exists within the Sunni Arab population, establishing a separate
Sunni government would be no easy task. If Bosnia is used as a metric, the international
community faces a significant amount of time and money to invest in the creation of an
independent Sunni state. From 1993 to 2010, the United States alone provided over $2
billion in aid to Bosnia, while the stabilization effort by the international community
overall has lasted over 17 years (Woehrel 2013). The time and money required to create a
Sunni state could easily match or exceed that of the Bosnia effort, especially with the
resources that would be needed to counter the ISIS threat.
The issue of economic stability for a Sunni state also needs to be addressed. Most
three-state models have the Sunni state occupying the far western portion of the current
state, with no water port or oil fields to operate. If the Kurds get the oil fields to the north
and the Shi’a Arabs get the Baghdad oil fields as well as the Basra oil fields, the
likelihood of a Sunni state flourishing is miniscule. A good portion of the land west of
Baghdad, not including the immediate area around the Euphrates River, is sparsely
populated desert. There is minimal land usable for agriculture and a significant amount of
money would need to be invested to develop an industrial complex in the Sunni state. In
addition, with no active port from which to export or import goods, the Sunni state would
be at the mercy of its neighbors to provide an import/export solution.
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The final issue is how to create a security force for the Sunni state. Will the Sunni
soldiers leave the Iraqi Army and form their own army? Will the Shi’a government give
the Sunni military equipment to strengthen the Sunni army? It is highly unlikely, due to
the Sunni-Shi’a sectarian divide, that the Shi’a would voluntarily provide the Sunni
Arabs any type of military capability, especially as the Sunni persecuted the Shi’a under
Saddam Husayn and also killed hundreds of people during the sectarian violence under
U.S. occupation. It is likely that a new military system, as well as equipment, would need
to be procured to establish the military and security complex needed to protect the Sunni
state. Again, this would require significant investment of time and money by the
international community. Finally, without an effective Sunni security force, the
separation of the Sunni Arab population from the rest of Iraq could allow ISIS to
maintain a strategic foothold in the proposed territory and establish its caliphate. This
would further destabilize the region as ISIS tries to extend its influence throughout the
Middle East.
Shiastan
The creation of a Shi’a micro-state would not pose the same challenges as the
creation of a Sunni state. During numerous meetings with Iraqi officials in 2011, it was
not uncommon to hear the argument that “Basra can survive without the rest of Iraq, but
Iraq cannot survive without Basra” (Poznick 2011, 1). While this sounds like a very bold
statement, there is truth to the adage. With the majority of the Shi’a population located in
southeast Iraq up to Baghdad, creation of a Shi’a state inclusive of the political system in
Baghdad would likely be an easy transition. The current Iraqi government is already
Shi’a dominated, and military and security control already rests in the hands of the Shi’a.
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Baghdad and Basra both have supergiant oil fields, and Basra has a port on the Persian
Gulf that would facilitate trade. In addition to the oil industry, Basra is also one of the
more fertile regions for agricultural development. Many of the economic or security
issues faced by the Kurds and the Sunni would be minimal in a Shi’a state; however, this
does not mean that a Shi’a state would be without problems.
The biggest hurdle facing a Shi’s state would likely be political inexperience. The
Shi’a have not been in control of the country as long as the Sunnis had been under the
mandate and subsequent regimes. Even the Kurds have maintained an independent form
of regional government since the end of the Gulf War, much longer than their Shi’a
counterparts. This lack of political expertise could lead to instability and corruption
within the political system and lack of support from the constituency. As seen from the
Arab Spring, if the proposed Shi’a state could not deliver the support that the population
expects, collapse of the central political system and creation of tribal territories would not
be out of the question.
A Shi’a state most likely would have the support of its neighbor, Iran. This
relationship would play an important role in regional politics. While ethnically diverse,
the two countries do share a common religious background. The current Iraqi government
has maintained positive relations with its neighbor that likely would continue with the
formation of a separate Shi’a state. Any threat perceived by Sunni sectarian violence
against the Shi’a in Iraq would most likely garner the support of Iran. This has been
especially evident in the recent ISIS conflict, as Iran has offered military support to Iraq
to counter the ISIS advance. This relationship does have the ability to create friction
within the Middle East should a sectarian conflict occur between Sunni and Shi’a groups.
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A minor sectarian conflict has the ability to spiral into a regional conflict should Iran and
Saudi Arabia choose to get involved.
Cross-Border Territorial Issues
The creation of three micro-states would create cross-border tensions within the
Middle East. The most probable conflict would be among the Kurds and Iraq’s neighboring countries in the north. “The Kurdish-inhabited areas cover the vast swathes of the
Middle East from southeastern Turkey and northeastern Syria through the entire north of
Iraq, to northwestern Iran and deep into the Iranian hinterland” (Bernstam 2011, 13). An
independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq could endanger the territorial integrity of these
three countries by instilling hope of a united Kurdistan state for all Kurds. History has
shown that the prospect of losing territory to the Kurds is not acceptable to any of these
countries. The KRG has had to play a balancing act with both Turkey and Iran, since the
PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and PJAK (Free Life of Kurdistan) rebels in the northeastern mountain region of Iraqi Kurdistan have been conducting attacks into Turkey and
Iran, respectively. “The KRG has refused Turkish and Iranian demands that they take
military action against the PKK and PJAK, and as a result, regular Turkish and Iranian
Air strikes and artillery bombardments periodically hit the rugged mountains of Iraqi
Kurdistan where the rebels are based” (Romano 2010, 1359). As recently as 2008,
Turkey authorized cross-border attacks into Iraq to target the PKK in retaliation for the
killing of 15 Turkish soldiers (Marr 2012). Iran conducted similar cross-border attacks as
recently as 2011 against the PJAK in an attempt to end a conflict that has been ongoing
since 2004. The resolve of these countries to maintain order and territorial integrity is
why they would oppose and independent Kurdish state. Their fears are warranted given
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the history of Kurdish guerilla groups retreating to northern Iraq after initiating conflict in
neighboring states.
Another territorial dispute that has occurred in recent months is the advancement
of ISIS into western Iraq. If Syria were not currently in a state of turmoil with its current
civil war and conflict with ISIS, the development of an independent Sunni state would
likely have been an easy target to annex by Syria’s President al-Assad. This is highly
unlikely at this time, since the insurgent group ISIS has already taken advantage of both
countries’ instability and has annexed territory in both states. This event just highlights
how easy annexation of territory can happen in the absence of a strong security force,
which would be needed if an independent Sunni state were to be created.
It is clear that the creation of three independent micro-states as a solution to Iraq’s
sectarian problems is not without its own shortcomings. A significant amount of capital
and time would need to be invested to ensure the viability and protection of each state
from both internal as well as external forces. This next section examines the concept of
Uti Possidetis Juris and why maintaining the current boundaries in Iraq is preferable to
dissolving the country.
Uti Possidetis Juris
The principle of Uti Possidetis Juris is based on the Roman legal principle of Uti
Possidetis, ita possideatis or “As you possess, you shall possess” (Vahlas 2013, 133).
The original application was used to settle personal property disputes in ancient Rome
but, in modern times, it has become the “repartition rule for organizing the division of
territories between modern States” (Vahlas 2013, 133-134). When Latin American and
African nations underwent decolonization in the 19th and 20th centuries, they utilized the
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principle of Uti Possidetis Juris and accepted their colonial territorial structures. To
oppose the application of this principle in the decolonizing regions would have had
profoundly negative effects. According to Fromkin (2009, 571-572):
If the native peoples had taken up arms in an attempt to achieve states and
boundaries corresponding to their political realities and their nationalist
dreams – as the nations of Europe had done, beginning with the French
Revolution of 1789 – bloodbaths would have been perpetual.
While the implementation of Uti Possidetis Juris in the process of decolonization has led
to internal territorial disputes and ethnic tensions, especially in the case of Africa,
opposing the colonial borders during the decolonization process could have very well
delayed the independence of nations in both regions as well as contribute to disastrous
conflicts.
In the late 20th century, the Uti Possidetis Juris principle was implemented to
address new borders for the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. During these
arbitrations, internal administrative boundaries were used as a territorial template to
address statehood claims. It must be noted that, in some cases, the implementation of the
Uti Possidetis Juris principle, where states were created using existing internal
administrative boundaries, has led to internal conflicts as well as sectarian violence. As
Vahlas (2013, 139) stated:
Serbs in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina and in Croatia, then in Kosovo, but also
Abkhazs, Adjars and Ossetians in Georgia, Armenians in Azerbaijan,
Chechens in Russia, Gagaouzes and Russians from Transniestria in
Moldova, all decided to fight rather than accept to be “locked in” former
administrative lines promoted international borders. Some of those armed
conflicts had a peaceful settlement but others are still without mutually
agreed solution and the uti possidetis principle is still ruled out by some
parties.
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Looking at the application of Uti Possidetis Juris over the last 200 years,
accepting the principle as implemented in the decolonization process is the best solution
for Iraq. Trying to build upon or improve the current political model within Iraq’s current
borders would be much more efficient and likely to have a longer lasting effect than
dissolution of the state. First, the current government, while not actively abiding by the
Constitution or federal principles, is based on a federal model that recognizes the need for
autonomy and incorporation of all ethno-linguistic-religious groups. While this model is
not perfect, it provides a framework for resolving the current sectarian conflict, whereas
dissolution of the state potentially could create more conflict. The best approach would
be to implement an improved federal model for Iraq based on the Swiss federal system.
Second, despite having multiple ethno-linguistic-religious groups, many citizens have
developed a sense of identity as Iraqis as well as Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurd. As faith in the
central government has decreased so has the Iraqi sense of identity. Developing the Iraqi
identity would further strengthen the current government, but the political leaders in the
country must set aside their sectarian differences for this to be successful. Finally, the
dissolution of Iraq would further destabilize the Middle East region as a whole. Islamic
fundamentalists could use the disorganization and chaos that would result in state
dissolution to push their radical agenda further throughout the region, which they have
already done in many states that were involved in the Arab Spring. Additionally, the
creation of three micros-states could create cross-border conflicts that would destabilize
the new states as well as their international neighbors.
If the principle of Uti Possidetis Juris were to be applied in creating a three-state
model for Iraq, it is highly likely, based on the experiences in Eastern Europe, that
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sectarian conflict would erupt between and within the three micro-states. There is no way
to separate successfully all of the ethno-linguistic-religious groups in Iraq, whereby each
group has its own territory. Furthermore, separation based upon internal administrative
divisions in Iraq would create enclaves of different sectarian groups within the three
micros states, creating the possibility of increased sectarian conflict. To counteract the
possibility of sectarian violence, redrawing borders based upon ethno-linguistic-religious
lines would be the best solution; however, this is not how the principle of Uti Possidetis
Juris has been applied by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
The benefit of promoting a federal model of government in Iraq within its current
borders significantly outweighs the risk of creating three micro-states. The next section
analyzes three possible outcomes for Iraq’s political model with the intent of identifying
the best solution for future governance and regional stability.
Developing a Stable Political Structure for Iraq
The analysis in the previous sections demonstrates that Iraq has faced significant
political, cultural, and economic challenges throughout its history that have affected the
successful implementation of its current system of federal government. This has led to
increased interest in implementing a three-state solution for Iraq. The disadvantages and
challenges discussed in creating a three-state solution argue that complete dissolution of
Iraq into three micro states would create more chaos in the region and require a
significant investment of time and capital by the international community. This section’s
goal is to analyze the implementation of three different models of government and
identify the best solution to stabilize Iraq utilizing the current geopolitical borders. The
three models to be analyzed are as follows:
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1. Iraq governed by a strong central government;
2. Development of a federal model with three key regions defined along ethnolinguistic-religious lines;
3. Iraq decentralized into multiple regional governments (more than three).
The advantages and disadvantages of each model are analyzed with the intent of
identifying the best model for peace and stability within Iraq.
Model 1 – A Strong Central Government
The creation of a strong central government for the state of Iraq is a dangerous
proposal. Since the creation of the state after WWI, Iraqi governments have been highly
centralized. Consisting of monarchies, military-sponsored regimes, and authoritarian
rulers, strong central governments in Iraq were extremely suppressive of the multi-ethnic
populations. Iraq’s history as an authoritarian state could make it more susceptible to
returning to that style of government should power be consolidated in the center.
Strong central governments are not uncommon in the Middle East region, and
Table 3 highlights the governmental structures of these states. Six of the fourteen
countries are monarchies, and six governments claim to be republics or federations.
However, “close scrutiny reveals that in most cases their claims to democratic credentials
have been purely rhetorical and void of substance in meeting even minimal criteria of
democratic credibility” (Saikal 2003, 113-114). The continued existence of authoritarian,
dictatorial, and totalitarian regimes in the Middle East can be attributed to the regimes’
oil-based economies. Over the past half century, one of the United States’ foreign policy
initiatives has been to protect the oil flowing from the Middle East. The US and Western
dependence on oil has led to the support of numerous authoritarian regimes within the
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Table 3: Middle East Governments
Country
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syria
United Arab Emirates
Yemen

Government
Monarchy
Republic
Theocratic Republic
Parliamentary Democracy
Parliamentary Democracy
Monarchy
Monarchy
Republic
Monarchy
Monarchy
Monarchy
Republic under Authoritarian Regime
Federation
Republic

Source: Created by the author from CIA (2014) data.
Middle East. Monshipouri (2002, 72) argued that “the Western world has gained more
access to the region’s oil resources by working with dictators rather than democratic
regimes accountable to their people.” The Western dependence on oil has helped
facilitate a democratic deficit within the Middle East region and has greatly impacted the
quality of life for a vast majority of the population. Oil wealth, typically, remains in the
hands of the elite and, to sustain authoritarian regimes, revenue from oil rents is utilized
to build “military-industrial enclaves” that allow governments to suppress their
challengers economically and forcefully (Henry 2003, 61; Barnett et al. 2003). As Iraq’s
economy is oil-centric, the development of a strong central government becomes a
dangerous scenario for the state’s population. By consolidating power in the center, the
Iraqi government could utilize its oil revenues to fund a security apparatus to suppress the
population, much like the Saddam Husayn regime.
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Recent events in Iraq have highlighted the centralization of power by the Shi’adominated government under the leadership of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. This
consolidation of power has taken on authoritarian characteristics and led to further
destabilization and increased sectarian violence. According to Fitzsimmons (2008, 8),
“historical experience with centralized power in democratizing multi-ethnic states is not
encouraging.” For example, Sudan experienced decades of civil war when the Arab
Muslims attempted to centralize power over the Christian and animist populations
(Fitzsimmons 2008). O’Leary (2010) argued that recentralization of power to an Arabdominated central government could result in a war with the Kurds and sectarian conflict
between the Sunni and the Shi’a. The advance of ISIS appears to be the precursor to these
predictions.
According to Sullivan (2013, 6), “Maliki began his security consolidation not
long after taking office in mid-2006.” Under this consolidation of power, Maliki has been
instituting measures that allow him to bypass constitutional checks and balances, as well
as marginalize his political competition. Sullivan (2013, 7) further stated that:
Maliki uses his control over the security and civil institutions mentioned
above in various ways to advance his interests. One objective is to
dismantle Iraqiyya’s senior leadership, while another is to expand his
control over Iraq’s financial institutions. Maliki has also used his control
over the security forces and judiciary to defuse a federalism challenge
from several Iraqi provinces. De-Ba‘thification, along with accusations of
terrorism and corruption, have become convenient political tools to
discredit and even remove opponents. Maliki is not the only politician in
Iraq to use these tools, but he has the most latitude in doing so on account
of his growing executive authority.
Maliki’s centralization of power and oppressive political tactics support Sullivan’s (2013)
characterization of Maliki’s government as authoritarian. The Prime Minister’s policies
are clearly in violation of the Iraqi Constitution, and they reinforce the argument that the
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Shi’a have just replaced the Sunni Arabs in government and have not embraced liberal
democracy. Sullivan (2013) further argues that Maliki’s opposition to federalist
movements by different provinces is directly related to his desire to maintain control over
Iraq’s oil revenues, which is characteristic of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.
Maliki’s policies and use of political power to discredit and remove his Sunni
Arab opponents has resulted in an increased Sunni-Shi’a divide. As discussed earlier,
ISIS received little opposition from the Sunni Arab provinces in western Iraq, which
should be a signal to the Shi’a Arab government that the Sunni Arabs desire a change in
governance. Additionally, Maliki’s policies to prevent the KRG development of the
Kurdish region’s oil resources, and repeated delay of the census and vote to settle the
Kirkuk dispute, have further pushed the Kurds to seek their own independent state. The
increased fragmentation, due to Maliki’s transgressions, has not been ignored. In August,
2014, Nouri al-Maliki was asked to resign as Prime Minister after significant pressure
from the Iranian government. According to Hashem (2014, 1), the Iranian government
supported a candidate that “wouldn’t intimidate the Sunnis and the Kurds” and could
“open closed channels with other parties.” The further development of an authoritarian
central government under Maliki was likely to fragment Iraq to the point of state failure,
and Iran’s involvement in his removal could have been prompted by Iranian fears of the
ISIS advance, which is quickly nearing it borders. Haider al-Abadi was selected to be the
new Prime Minister of Iraq and, if unification of the state is one of his goals, it is clear
that he has a difficult road ahead. If al-Abadi chooses to continue the practices of Nouri
al-Maliki, then Sunni and Kurdish support is not likely to materialize; however, the
appointment of al-Abadi is an opportunity for the Shi’a-dominated government to redress
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the injustices created by the Maliki government over the last seven years and implement
the federal principles that have been ignored in the Constitution. Maliki’s policies
demonstrated that Iraq, despite its federal constitution, was headed towards an
authoritarian model of government. It is too early to tell if the al-Abadi government
might reverse Maliki’s policies and create a more unified Iraqi state, but it is evident that
reform is necessary for Iraq to remain a stable political state.
In contrast to an authoritarian state, the creation of a strong central government
under a federal model may be a viable solution for Iraq. The development of strong
central governments within federal models is not inherently hazardous. According to
Smith (2005, 131):
The history or federalism warns that federal structures, in order to work,
must be both a product of conscious efforts – rather than de facto creations
– and built on the foundation of a strong central state.
The development of a federal model with a strong central government enables the
government potentially to prevent state fracture from secessionist and autonomy
movements in ethnically diverse countries. It also provides a degree of control to better
facilitate disputes within the state.
The U.S. serves as a good example when analyzing federal systems with strong
central governments. Much like Iraq, the U.S. colonialists feared the creation of a strong
central government after being under the rule of the British Monarchy; however, after the
Articles of Confederation proved to be an ineffective constitution, it was replaced with
the U.S. Constitution that provided for a strong central government that has endured for
over 200 years. The problem that exists in creating a strong central government for Iraq
lies in the failure of the Iraqi Constitution to allow for its creation. When developing the
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Constitution, the Kurds lobbied to create a weak central government with powers
devolved to the regions and governorates. They were successful in this endeavor and,
upon ratification of the 2005 Constitution, the government of Iraq was established under
a weak federal model. While decentralization of power to the regions and governorates
was an expected attempt to satisfy the multiple ethno-linguistic-religious groups, its rapid
implementation only led to increased sectarian conflict and disputes between the regions
and the central government. This was partly a result of the Iraqi Constitution lacking
clarity, possessing contradictory language, and failing to define effectively the powersharing arrangements between the central government and the regions and governorates.
To develop a strong central government under the Iraqi federal system, the Constitution
will need to be amended to address these shortcomings.
The advantage of developing a strong central government is that it could allow for
a smoother transition or devolution of power to the regions or governorates over time.
Since the creation of Iraq following WWI, the population had been accustomed to strong
central governments and authoritarian rule. Much like Nigeria, regional and ethnic
rivalries were immediately destabilizing for Iraq upon transition to a federal model with a
weak central government. A strong central government could have exerted influence to
control these rivalries, while fostering national unity under a federal system.
Additionally, a strong central government could have utilized its judiciary to resolve the
issues of natural resource control and ensure equitable distribution of those resources
throughout the state. Despite these advantages, the distrust between the Sunni and Shi’a,
as well as the Arabs and Kurds, runs deep. The likelihood of creating a strong central
government under the current provincial system in Iraq is miniscule, due to the lack of
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support that it would receive from the ethno-linguistic-religious groups. The following
section provides analysis on how to address these concerns through the implementation
of a new federal model, which could strengthen the central government but also achieve
the demands of the ethno-linguistic-religious groups.
Model 2 - The Three Region Federal Solution
The development of a three-region federal model defined along ethno-linguisticreligious lines is proposed as the best solution for the continued existence of the state of
Iraq. To achieve the stability needed to establish a working federal government,
implementation of a Swiss-type federal model could provide Iraq with a framework to
build its multi-ethnic federation. This next phase of the analysis identifies the factors
necessary to implement the Swiss model, examines the current Iraqi Constitution to
identify the critical problems between the central government and the regions, and
addresses the challenges inherent in the creation of a three-region solution.
Laying the Groundwork for the Swiss Federal Model
The implementation of the Swiss model initially is contingent upon three factors.
First, all of the ethno-linguistic-religious groups need to be willing to participate in the
development of the new government as well as amending the current Constitution. This
would require the support and participation of the Kurds, Sunni, and Shi’a politicians as
well as the different minority ethnic populations of the state (e.g., Turkomen and
Yezidis). One solution to facilitate maximum cooperation would be to establish an
international conference, much like the Dayton Accords (Merritt 2007). According to AlRahim (2007, 1):
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A Dayton-like process for Iraq would be a multi-tiered international
engagement. At its heart would be an Iraqi national compact forged by
Iraqis with international and regional endorsement.
“The process would require attendance by Turkey, Syria, Iran, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia
to address all three ethnic outside influences and key leaders from all Iraqi political
parties” (Merritt 2007, 70-71). Bringing together Iraq’s international neighbors makes
these states accountable for a successful solution to Iraq’s internal conflict. The
international community, specifically Iraq’s geopolitical neighbors, has a vested interest
in maintaining the current borders of Iraq. Having these states participate in the process
allows them to take ownership of the regional problem and help to develop a viable
solution.
The second hurdle that would need to be crossed prior to the implementation of
the Swiss model is the reestablishment of Iraq’s international borders. ISIS has
successfully seized territory from western Iraq to within 25 miles of the Iranian border. A
critical component of establishing a unified state is having a stable internal security
apparatus in place to secure the borders of the state. This does not mean that the ISIS
threat would have to be eliminated completely prior to implementation of the Swiss
model, but Iraqi territory must be regained and the ISIS threat reduced to an insurgency,
not an occupation. The accomplishment of this task would need a concerted effort by all
ethno-linguistic-religious groups in the state and the international community. Expelling
the ISIS threat from Iraq could act as the unifying force needed to bring the ethnolinguistic-religious groups in Iraq, as well as Iraq’s regional neighbors, to the negotiating
table to establish a more stable state.
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The third challenge that needs to be met is the refinement and amendment of the
Iraqi Constitution. This process needs to occur concurrently with the transition to a
Swiss-based federal model to ensure deficiencies in the Iraqi Constitution are corrected
and aspects of the Swiss Constitution can be implemented. Every effort needs to be made
not to make the same mistakes made by the CPA and opposition leaders after the fall of
the Saddam Husayn regime. Specifically, there is no reason to dissolve the current
government or security forces in the state. This would only create chaos and further
destabilize the region. More importantly, there is no need to dissolve the current Iraqi
Constitution, but rather it needs amending to resolve the lack of clarity, to clarify the
contradictory language, and to define clearly the power-sharing arrangements between
the central government and the regions and governorates that need to occur. A brief
review of how the current Iraqi Constitution was developed provides an understanding of
the contentious issues that have plagued the state.
The Iraqi Constitution was drafted in less than four months and presented to the
population for referendum in October, 2005. Its development took place rapidly, which
resulted in a document that highlighted the sectarian divide and created a number of
issues that have hindered the stability of the state. “There was no discussion of the
provisions that would later become highly contentious, such as the broad federal system,
the exploitation of oil and gas, and the weakness of the centre of the country in dealing
with the regions” (Jawad 2013, 11). While the issues that plague the effectiveness of the
Constitution are numerous, the critical issue that must be addressed is the relationship
between the central government and the regions
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The powers of the federal government are recognized in section four of the
Constitution and include “formulating foreign policy and national security policy,
exercising control over Iraq’s armed forces, securing the country’s borders, defending
Iraq, formulating fiscal policy, drawing up a national budget, and planning policies on
water sources external to Iraq (Marr 2012, 295). The defined powers are typical for a
central government to execute, but the contradictory language identified in Article 115
and Article 121 of the Constitution gives regional governments the power to supersede
these responsibilities. Article 115 (UNHCR 2005) established the power-sharing
relationship between the federal government and the regions/governorates thus:
All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal
government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that
are not organized in a region. With regard to other powers shared between
the federal government and the regional government, priority shall be
given to the law of the regions and governorates not organized in a region
in case of dispute.
Moreover, Article 121 (UNHCR 2005) stated that:
In case of a contradiction between regional and national legislation in
respect to a matter outside the exclusive powers of the federal government,
the regional authority shall have the right to amend the application of the
national legislation within that region.
As the Constitution is currently written, the regions and governorates have significant
power when dealing with matters not clearly defined within as powers of the central
government; furthermore, the Constitution allows for regional governments to establish
laws that directly contradict the central government’s powers.
It is evident that the Constitution needs to be reformed in order to address the
issues created by its drafters. Many of the problems that exist within Iraq result from the
KRG’s and governorates’ powers defined or not defined by the Iraqi Constitution. The
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KRG continues to exploit the Constitution’s weaknesses in matters of foreign affairs, the
armed forces, and resource exploitation. There have been numerous demands to amend
the Constitution, but Article 126 prevents amendment on the most controversial matters
(UNHCR 2005):
Articles of the Constitution may not be amended if such amendment takes
away from the powers of the regions that are not within the exclusive
powers of the federal authorities, except by the approval of the legislative
authority of the concerned region and the approval of the majority of its
citizens in a general referendum.
This essentially provides the KRG with veto power over proposed amendments, as Jawad
(2013, 23) stated:
To correct all these mistakes and solve the existing problems, a consensus
should be reached by the different blocs that dominate the Parliament.
Even the Kurdish Regional Government’s refusal to consider amendments
and the accompanying threat of secession should be mitigated, especially
following the US administration’s clear indication that a Kurdish
independent state in Iraq is out of the question.
Amending the Constitution to facilitate the creation of a more clearly defined central
government would be necessary to implement a three-region federal model. In addition,
the contradictory language needs to be addressed by both the amendment process and the
judiciary to define clearly the role of the central government and the power-sharing
agreements between the central government and the regions. The one benefit of the
current Constitution is that it provides a basic framework to establish federal regions.
Developing the Three Region Solution under the Swiss Federal Model
Establishing three federal regions in Iraq has been discussed as an option to Iraq’s
political crisis ever since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. U.S. Vice-President Joseph Biden (at
the time Senator Biden) and Leslie Gelb developed a plan to partition Iraq into three
semi-independent regions based upon ethno-linguistic-religious groups (Cohen 2007;
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Lederman 2014). The plan, based upon the Dayton Accords, called for the creation of
three distinct regions consisting of Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs, and Kurds. The plan further
stipulated that “the central government in Baghdad would handle security and foreign
affairs plus distribute the nation’s vast oil revenues among the groups – the glue that
would hold the three regions together” (Lederman 2014, 1). The Bush Administration
chose not to accept the suggested political model presented by Biden and Congress and
so, eleven years after the 2003 invasion, numerous sectarian conflicts have divided Iraq
along sectarian lines. This has resulted in political leaders from the international
community trying to re-evaluate the implementation of a three-region solution.
The three-region model is not a perfect solution. If Iraq were to be partitioned into
three federal regions, the drawing of the internal borders creates an issue of intermixed
populations such as Arab-Kurd and Sunni-Shi’a communities. It is important to note that
the sectarian violence occurring in Iraq after the U.S. invasion led to the migration of
ethno-linguistic-religious groups to areas that were more culturally homogeneous, similar
to what happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s. Despite the migrations,
intermixed communities still exist, and there is no way to divide Iraq into three ethnically
pure regions. Implementation of a Swiss-type federal model could provide the solution
needed to address successfully the ethno-linguistic-religious problems created by
dividing Iraq into three federal regions, as well as solve some of Iraq’s more pressing
territorial and constitutional disputes.
Figure 9 provides a three-region partition model for Iraq, which was first
proposed by Merritt (2007). The model establishes three federal regions similar to the
Biden model and also creates a city-state centered on Baghdad. The benefit of this
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partition model is that it concedes disputed territorial areas to the different ethnolinguistic-religious groups and addresses economic and historical challenges that exist
under the current governmental structure. Examination of the model from north to south
to highlight the benefits of its implementation may prove useful.
Figure 10 shows a comparison of Iraq’s oil reserves with the three-region partition
model of Iraq. The first benefit of the model addresses the Sunni Arab concerns of an oil
resource deficiency in a Sunni-established federal region. One of the greatest fears of the
Sunni population is the lack of natural resources in their region. By establishing the Sunni
region’s border north of Mosul, the Sunni Arabs would have access to some of Iraq’s
northern oil fields, thereby addressing the Sunni Arab concern over access to the
country’s oil industry. Second, the model concedes Kirkuk to the Kurdish federal region
in the north. This would put to rest a territorial dispute that has been present in Iraq since
the inception of the state. Since the city is believed to be predominantly Kurdish, the act
of including Kirkuk in the Kurdish federal region could serve as an olive branch to
encourage the Kurds to be more open to the implementation of the three-region federal
model. Finally, Baghdad could be established as a city-state (similar to Washington
D.C.), and not part of an ethnic federal region. This counterbalances both the Sunni and
Shi’a Arab’s historical and territorial claims over the city and allows the capital of Iraq to
remain a neutral area focused on the governance of the federal state (Merritt 2007).
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region in which they are located. For devolution to work in Iraq, it would be absolutely
necessary for the devolved powers to be written into the Iraqi Constitution as well as the
regional constitutions. Clearly defining the devolved powers within the state and regional
constitutions would alleviate conflicts between the multiple ethno-linguistic-religious
groups in the regions, as well as decrease conflict between the regions and the central
government. This could allow the central government to focus on more important issues
such as state security, foreign policy, and economic development.
Another important aspect of the Swiss federal model, which could alleviate the
fears of minority populations in the proposed Iraq federal regions, is the concept of trilevel citizenship. According to Article 37 of the Swiss Constitution, “a Swiss citizen is [a
person], who has the citizenship of a Municipality and the citizenship of the Canton”
(ICL 2000). This tri-level citizenship allows the Swiss population to retain their cultural
identity, while also fostering a sense of Swiss nationalism. In Iraq, where sectarian
violence has almost destroyed Iraqi nationalism, a multi-level citizenship could become a
unifying force in the state by allowing Iraqis to maintain their cultural identity. Article 3
of the Iraqi Constitution (UNHCR 2005) states:
Iraq is a country of multiple nationalities, religions, and sects. It is a
founding and active member in the Arab League and is committed to its
charter, and it is part of the Islamic world.
Moreover, Article 18, paragraph 1, of the Iraqi Constitution states that “Iraqi citizenship
is a right for every Iraqi and is the basis of his nationality” (UNHCR 2005). Both Article
3 and Article 18 support the notion of an ethnic identity and a state national identity. This
dual identity was marginalized by the sectarian violence that has ravaged the state since
the U.S. invasion in 2003. Amending the Constitution to recognize multiple ethno-
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linguistic-religious identities could provide a framework to rebuild Iraq’s national
identity by distinguishing the importance of the cultural heritage of the population as a
component of Iraq’s national identity.
Defining the powers of Iraq’s central and regional governments is another
imperative and fundamental issue that must be resolved. The current Iraqi Constitution
has given the regions and governorates significant power when dealing with matters not
clearly defined in the Constitution as powers of the central government; furthermore, the
Constitution allows for regional governments to establish laws that directly contradict the
central government’s powers. The Swiss have addressed the federal-cantonal legal issues
in their constitution under Article 49 (ICL 2000), which states:
1. Federal law takes precedence over contrary cantonal law;
2. The Federation ensures the adherence to the Federal law by the cantons.
Iraq needs to amend its Constitution to reflect the Swiss Constitution and to ensure that
regional governments’ constitutions cannot contradict national law. This does not
necessarily create a strong central government, but it does allow the central government
to perform its assigned responsibilities without having to mediate with the regions on
contradictory legal language.
The devolution of power to the three regions also needs to be addressed. As stated
in Article 42, 43 and 43a of the Swiss Constitution (ICL 2000):
Article 42. Tasks of the Federation,
1. The Federation accomplishes tasks allocated to it by the Constitution;
Article 43. Tasks of the Cantons,
1. The Cantons define the tasks to be accomplished within the framework
of their competencies;
Art. 43a. Principles for the Allocation and Fulfilment of State Functions;
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1. The Federation only undertakes tasks that the Cantons are unable to
perform or which require uniform regulation by the Federation.
The regional governments of the proposed three-region model need to be able to fulfill
their obligations to their populations. In areas where the regions cannot competently
accomplish tasks, the central government needs to undertake those tasks. This is clearly
defined in Article 43 of the Swiss Constitution and Article 123 of the Iraqi Constitution,
but the execution of this power delegation has not occurred down to the regional
government or up to the federal government in Iraq. The developers of the Iraqi
Constitution were so concerned with minimizing the power of the central government
that they maximized their power with no way to execute some of their responsibilities.
This needs to be addressed to better facilitate services to the Iraqi population. The benefit
of defining regional and federal powers in this way would allow the Iraqi regions to
increase their ownership and responsibility as their infrastructure develops. While the
central government may initially retain the power, it can be devolved at a later date to the
regions as they become more self-sufficient.
In the economic arena, the Swiss Constitution provides guidelines for fiscal
equality among the cantons, which, in turn, the cantons do for the municipalities. In the
case of Iraq, the oil reserves have the greatest potential to create social and wealth
polarization in the state. Within the current Iraqi Constitution, there is contradictory
language on who has the authority to develop oil resources. It is imperative that this
language be adjusted, giving the central government control over natural resource
development. The central government of Iraq should be responsible for ensuring that
polarization due to the presence of oil reserves does not affect its regions. In the case of
Nigeria, mismanagement of the country’s oil resources resulted in political corruption
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and conflict between Nigeria’s regions; furthermore, it has directly contributed to the lack
of broad-based economic diversification in Nigeria (Suberu 2010). To prevent this from
occurring in Iraq, the management of the oil industry needs to remain with the central
government to ensure equitable distribution of oil profits to the regions and into areas of
economic diversification for the state. As stated in Article 111 of the Iraqi Constitution,
“Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates”
(UNHCR 2005). This Article needs to be enforced and utilized to build the infrastructure
of the state and the regions.
The Islamic religion plays a defining role in the Middle East and Iraq. When
drafting the Constitution, the Sunni and the Kurdish members of the committed lobbied
for a more secular document, while many of the Shi’a politicians from religious-based
political parties insisted upon the mention of Islam in the Iraqi Constitution. Thus, Article
2 of the Iraqi Constitution (UNHCR 2005) states the following:
First: Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation source
of legislation:
A. No law may be enacted that contradicts the established
provisions of Islam
B. No law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of
democracy.
C. No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic
freedoms stipulated in this Constitution.
Second: This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority
of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights to freedom of
religious belief and practice of all individuals such as Christians, Yazidis,
and Mandean Sabeans.
As a consequence, Jawad (2013, 15) believes that:
While there may be no harm in stating Islam is the official religion of the
state as the overwhelming majority of the population is Muslim, Point A
rendered meaningless all the positive aspects that were mentioned in
Chapter Two (The Liberties), Articles 14 – 46. In reality, practice, and
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with the domination of the religious parties, institutions and personalities,
any liberty could be cancelled if a religious institution claimed that it
contradicts Islamic beliefs, as we have seen in many Middle Eastern
states.
Jawad (2013) makes a strong argument. While the incorporation of Islamic principles
should not be a necessary component of the Constitution or the Iraqi government, the
power the religious leaders have over their communities directly impacted the
government’s ability not to incorporate Islam as part of the government. This is where
diversion from the Swiss federal model occurs. The Swiss Constitution accounts for the
religious freedom of its population, as does the Iraqi Constitution; however, the Iraqi
Constitution incorporates Islamic principles into its execution of government, where the
Swiss Constitution does not. There is no easy answer to resolve this possible conflict, but
the best course of action for the Iraqi government would be to devolve religious powers
to the regions, and further devolve them to the provinces and tribes. Keeping religious
activity at the local level and allowing each region to determine how to apply the tenets
of Islam could cushion the central state from potential conflict.
Maintaining positive relations with religious leaders is also paramount. As the
current Iraqi government has failed to provide basic needs and services for its population,
the religious leaders of the country have tried to fill that void. Regional and local
politicians should work with religious leaders to improve the quality of life for their
populations. This could create credibility for the federal regions with their internal
populations. More importantly, it keeps the central government out of religious affairs
and focused on running the state. Finally, maintaining a positive relationship with
religious leaders could prevent conflict with Islamic Fundamentalists, who have created
significant problems for the Iraqi government in the past. If the regions have positive
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relations with religious leaders and the community, then Islamic Fundamentalists will
have less influence on the population.
Establishing a three-region federal model in Iraq could have profound positive
impacts when paired with principles found in the Swiss federal model. While the model
is not perfect, it does provide solutions to improve the current structure of Iraq’s
government. It must be noted that there are critics of the three-region federal model.
Fitzsimmons (2008) believes that devolution of Iraq into ethno-sectarian communities
(e.g., the three-region model) would fail, like the post-colonial Nigerian government in
the 1960s. Fitzsimmons (2008, 6) argued that:
strongly aligning Iraq’s political institutions with its ethno-sectarian
identities is likely to entrench the efficacies of those identities in Iraqi
politics and lock in the zero-sum nature of competition that has generated
so much instability.
Fitzsimmons’ (2008) argument is based on the current Iraqi Constitution and a set of
variables that has since changed over the past six years. Specifically, the Iraqi population
has already fallen prey to sectarian divide without a three-region model. It is highly
unlikely that this will change under the current government structure. Implementation of
the Swiss federal model in a three-region Iraq provides a framework for the regions to
operate harmoniously, regardless of ethnic makeup, and to mediate inter-regional
disputes when they arise.
Model 3 - The Multiple Regional Government Solution
The decentralization of Iraq into multiple regional governments is an option that
has been argued by opponents to the three-region model, but the exact structure is
something that has not been agreed upon. According to Fitzsimmons (2008, 6), “the form
of decentralization most feared by Iraqi nationalists is the one predicated on creation of
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new regional governments,” and he believes that devolving powers to the provincial level
may be a solution to developing Iraq’s federal system because the provincial political
structure already exists and would not require development of new regions. This model
creates two problems. First, the 18-province model fails to accommodate an autonomous
Kurdish region, which creates a significant problem of implementation considering that
the Kurds would not easily give up their regional status. Second, the 18-province model
also assumes that “the provincial governments will be able to effectively shoulder greater
responsibilities for basic governance” (Fitzsimmons 2008, 7). This would require a
significant improvement in provincial infrastructure and political institutions in order to
be a feasible option. Advocates of a regional federal model like Al-Rubaie (2008),
Anderson and Stansfield (2005), and O’Leary (2010) foresee the development of a fiveregion model as a more viable solution than a provincial model. Al-Rubaie (2008, 1)
stated:
Iraq's political geography suggests five likely federal units: A "Kurdistan
province," including the current Kurdistan and surrounding areas; a
"Western province," including Mosul and the upper Tigris and Euphrates
valleys; a "Kufa province," built around the Middle Euphrates
governorates; a "Basra province," including the lower Tigris and
Euphrates valleys; and a "Baghdad province," built around Greater
Baghdad, which may include parts of Diyala and Salah ad Din
Governorates.
The likelihood of Iraq devolving powers directly to all 18 governorates is unlikely, but
Al-Rubaie’s (2008) five-region model under a federal system does provide a viable
solution.
The most significant difference between the three-region model and the fiveregion model is the separation of the Shi’a communities into three distinct regions:
Baghdad, Basra, and Kufa. The location of regional borders for a Sunni Arab and a
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Kurdish region also differ slightly, which does limit the oil reserves available to the
Sunni Arabs. The benefit of the five-region model is that it creates regions with balanced
population distributions and creates five strong regional governments with power
devolved from the central government in Baghdad (Anderson and Stansfield 2005). The
Swiss federal model could be applied to the five-region model, much like the three-region
solution; however, the potential of secessionist movements could possibly be greater in a
five-region model as opposed to the three-region model, complicating the implementation
of the Swiss federal model.
Figure 11 recreates Al-Rubaie’s (2008) five-region model and provides insight
into why this model could be more prone to fragmentation and secession movements than
the three-region model. As the map illustrates, the Basra, Baghdad, and Kurdish regions
contain the majority of Iraq’s oil reserves, leaving the Kufa and Western (Sunni) regions
with almost no significant oil fields. This could create economic disparity for both the
Western and Kufa regions, much like Nigeria, possibly sparking inter-regional conflict
and secessionist movements over increased wealth polarization due to lack of economic
opportunities created by the oil industry. In addition, the Kufa region incorporates the
two holy cities of Karbala and Najaf. Anderson and Stansfield (2005, 379) described the
proposed Kufa region as a Holy Region, which could be governed according to the tenets
of Islam, relieving the federal government from having to address Islam as “either ‘a’ or
‘the’ source of law.”
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environment of internal regional cooperation, which is supported by the Swiss federal
model. The five-region solution does not require cooperation between the two groups,
therefore creating an element of instability.
If the five-region model failed to maintain the stability of southern Iraq, the
consequences could be catastrophic for the state. If a secessionist movement started in the
south, the Kurds would most likely follow with their own secessionist movement in the
north. This could lead to sectarian and tribal conflict across the country that would
essentially rip the state apart. Western Iraq would become an easy target for Islamic
groups such as ISIS, allowing Islamic Fundamentalist groups to overwhelm the more
secular Sunni elements in the west. The Shi’a areas of southern Iraq would likely engage
in a tribal war, resulting in the creation of multiple Shi’a micro-states. The Kurds could
experience their own internal struggles between the PUK and the KDP, which might lead
to the disintegration of the Kurdish region into as many as three separate micro-states to
include Dihok, Erbil, and Sulaimani. The effects of Iraq’s disintegration would be felt
throughout the Middle East region. Large numbers of refugees would be created, regional
conflict would increase between Middle East states and Kurdish communities in Iraq,
Syria, Turkey, and Iran, and the establishment of an Islamic State Caliphate would
become more likely. Ultimately, the implementation of a model with five or more
regions, while plausible, is more likely to lead to the fragmentation and disintegration of
the state of Iraq than the development of a strong central government based on a threeregion model following the Swiss federalism ideal.

110

Conclusion
Three models were proposed and analyzed in this thesis to determine their ability
to stabilize successfully the state of Iraq within its current geopolitical borders:
1.

Iraq governed by a strong central government;

2. Development of a federal model with three key regions defined along ethnolinguistic-religious lines;
3. Iraq decentralized into multiple regional governments (more than three).
This thesis’ working argument was that the most likely route to achieving long-term
political stability within Iraq is implementation of a three-region federal model that
incorporates elements of the Swiss federal model into Iraq’s government. Based on the
analysis, it is clear that all three geopolitical models offer positive and negative
characteristics if implemented.
The first model, development of a strong central government, is a dangerous
proposition. Iraq’s history of authoritarian regimes makes it more susceptible to
reestablishing this past system of government if power is consolidated in the center. This
is demonstrated by Nouri al-Maliki centralizing power despite the current Constitution’s
establishment of a weak federal government. Al-Maliki’s government has been
characterized as authoritarian and is being touted as a critical cause of sectarian violence
in the state. To prevent the establishment of an authoritarian central government, Iraqi
politicians would need to work diligently to ensure the checks and balances in the
Constitution are upheld. Furthermore, correcting problems in the Constitution that
allowed al-Maliki to bypass the checks and balance system in the first place needs to
occur.
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The benefits of a strong central government in Iraq designed along the Swiss
federal model does allow for a gradual devolution of power as the regions become more
self-sufficient. A strong central government would also be able to address internal
security threats, regional conflicts, and secessionist movements more effectively. In
addition, a strong central government is needed to manage Iraq’s natural resources to
ensure equitable distribution of oil wealth and infrastructural improvements throughout
the state. Incorporating elements of the strong central government model into the threeregion model may be the best solution for a Federated Iraq.
The three-region model, based on Swiss federalism, could settle successfully
many of the internal political and territorial disputes that have created fragmentation
within the state. The model addresses Sunni Arab concerns over access to the state’s oil
industry, the dispute over Kirkuk’s territorial status could be resolved, and the new role
of Baghdad as a multi-ethnic city-state focused on national politics could resolve the
Sunni-Shi’a historical claims over control of the city. The Swiss federal model provides a
framework to support ethnic tolerance through specific power devolution, internal
cooperation, and conflict resolution between the different tribal and ethnic groups within
each region, and external cooperation and adjudication of issues between the regions and
the central government. The model also would allow for the devolution of religious
matters to the local level, creating a beneficial separation between religion and the central
government. Finally, the development of an Iraqi national identity, by acknowledging the
multi-ethnic makeup of the state, could be enhanced through the implementation of a
multi-level citizenship. An Iraqi national identity would be a critical element of state
stability. While the three-region model provides a number of solutions, all of these
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benefits would be contingent upon the state’s ability to rectify the shortcomings found in
the Iraqi Constitution.
Implementation of a multi-regional model poses its own benefits and challenges.
Separating Iraq into multiple regions of equal size and population distribution is a
feasible model, if structured like the three-region model to include characteristics of the
Swiss federal model. What could be problematic is the increased likelihood of regions
seeking to secede from the central state because they have no internally binding
characteristics with the central government. Cooperation is not a necessary component
between secular and religious political groups under this model. If a Holy Region were to
be created, religious leaders could incite a secessionist movement. Much like the domino
effect, if one region seceded, it could open the doors for others to do the same, creating
instability that could lead to state fracture. In addition, this model would be ideal for
Islamic Fundamentalists to operate within. Holy regions could provide a safe haven for
fundamentalist groups, which would not only destabilize the state, but could destabilize
the region. For the multi-regional model to be successful, a strong central government
would be a necessary component to ensure secessionist forces did not destabilize the
state; however, if not kept in check, a strong central government could develop into an
authoritarian state as increased control over security forces would be needed to deal with
internal instability.
Finally, it is clear that more analysis is needed to determine the best course of
action to establish a more stable Iraq. To prevent the same mistakes of the CPA after the
fall of Saddam Husayn, a necessary component of the analysis must include subjectmatter experts on the dynamics of Iraq’s multiple ethno-linguistic-religious groups. An
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international conference, much like the Dayton Accords, would be extremely beneficial
to resolving the Iraq question, and it would provide regional states as well as the
international community a forum to address the problems that currently plague Iraq. But
before this can occur, the ISIS threat needs to be contained. While it is unlikely that ISIS
would be able to establish a caliphate, if the fundamentalist group is not dealt with
quickly, its actions could destabilize Iraq to the point of fracture, creating multiple
independent micro-states. This outcome could further destabilize the Middle East and
create significant problems for the international community.
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